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I Global transformations and new questions 
Hubert Schmitz and Dirk Messner 
Introduction 
This paper is concerned with one of the big issues of our time: the rise of China and India 
and the challenges which this presents for Europe. It concentrates on the rise of China and 
India as innovation powers and on their increasingly important role in finding solutions to 
global climate change. In both these fields, European business and policy needs to address 
issues of conflict/competition but also find ways of working together with China and 
India. And both fields are related to each other in that innovative capacity is essential for 
mitigating climate change. Ways forward require the ability to define the issues clearly 
and see them from both the Asian and European side. This is precisely what we sought to 
achieve at a workshop held in Bonn, 17–18 January 2008. The ambition was to go straight 
to the frontiers of knowledge and identify the questions which future policy oriented 
research needs to address. 
At this workshop, we succeeded in:  
– bringing together European and Asian perspectives, expressed by leading researchers, 
high level policy makers and influential business leaders; 
– integrating the innovation and climate change agenda, generating insights and 
suggestions from all sides, including the business leaders;  
– showing how the common divide between research and policy can be overcome and 
how agendas for research and action can be developed together; 
– identifying key organisational challenges that need to be confronted in conducting a 
research programme which brings European and Asian researchers together and which 
can influence policy processes and outcomes. 
In a publication it is impossible to recreate the richness of the debate and the excitement of 
the participants. Our aim here is more modest: to bring together some of the key inputs 
into the workshop. These inputs result from a project which was funded by the 
Volkswagen Foundation and carried out jointly by the German Development Institute 
(Bonn) and the Institute of Development Studies (Sussex).  
1 What are the issues and why are they important?  
The purpose of this project was to frame the field of enquiry and define the key research 
issues which arise for Europe from the rise of China and India and to then ‘test’ the 
resulting agenda with experienced researchers, policy makers and business leaders.  
In order to develop the agenda, the German Development Institute (DIE) and Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) research teams asked: why are European politicians and 
policy makers concerned about the rising powers of Asia? These reasons vary a great deal 
(depending on prejudices, positions and responsibilities), but they seem to boil down to 
three underlying concerns: 
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– maintaining or increasing prosperity 
– ensuring that this prosperity is sustainable (in economic and environmental terms) 
– finding a vision for Europe’s changing political and economic role in the world. 
This in essence is what it is all about. Most of the public discussion is driven by fear about 
prosperity: has it peaked, will it decline, would a rise be sustainable? The counter-position, 
exemplified by Leadbeater / Wilsdon (2007) is that there is no zero sum game, that there 
are enormous opportunities, that decline and conflict can be avoided.  
The research team then concluded that by focusing on innovation and climate change, one 
can go to the heart of this debate: innovation jobs are the bedrock of West European 
prosperity. The key questions are: a) whether China’s and India’s advances undermine the 
European innovation-based competitive advantages, specifically in the areas of energy and 
resource efficiency; and b) whether and how Europe can work with China and India in 
order to find mutually acceptable solutions in the global governance arenas dealing 
directly and indirectly with climate change.  
Climate change has become a driver of change in its own right. Reducing carbon 
emissions has risen to the top of the policy agenda in Western Europe, driven by concerns 
with maintaining high levels of living for current and future generations. China’s and 
India’s growth trajectory seems in direct conflict with this objective. Finding solutions 
requires understanding dynamics internal to these countries, understanding the reasons for 
the failure of global collective action, and developing viable low carbon technologies. 
In both political and technological terms, Europe is well equipped to deal with these 
challenges. If politicians and policy makers cannot find a leadership role for Europe in 
innovation and climate issues they are unlikely to find it anywhere else.  
This is how the research team prioritised the issues and delimited the field of debate. The 
papers included in this publication set this out more fully and then deepen the analysis and 
refine the research issues. Before introducing these papers, it is useful to map out the 
changing global context.  
2 Three waves of global change  
In order to contextualise the challenges faced by Europe, it is useful to distinguish 
between three waves of global change – captured in Figure 1. The main characteristic of 
the first wave is the massive reduction in the barriers to flows of goods, finance, and 
information in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Trade liberalisation and rapid advances in 
transport and communication technology facilitated a major shift of manufacturing 
capability away from the countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) to the developing world. The speed with which these capabilities 
were acquired was accelerated by the integration of developing country producers into 
global value chains governed by lead firms in the USA or EU. Politically this economic 
globalisation was characterised by the declining power of nation states, which was not 
accompanied by more effective global governance. These global governance failures were 
most visible in the inability to curb the volatility of global financial flows.   
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While the effects of the first wave continue to be powerful, a second wave became 
noticeable as from the turn of the century emanating from the new powers in Asia. In 
order to give expression to this new reality we called them ‘Asian Drivers’ (Kaplinsky 
2006). While the OECD countries continue to be important, the change comes primarily 
from Asia, in particular China but increasingly also India. This second wave undermines 
the perception of ‘globalization as westernisation or even americanisation’. As discussed 
throughout this paper, this shift in power has begun to define the agenda of the global 
political economy – for both researchers and policy makers.  
While we are still catching our breath, a third wave is on its way: global climate change. 
While seen by some as scare mongering of over-enthusiastic environmentalists, it is 
increasingly recognised that climate change is real and that global warming poses 
unprecedented economic and political challenges arising at global and local levels. 
European prosperity is based on globalised energy, transport and production systems 
which are not sustainable in their current form. The pressure for action will mount at local, 
national and global levels. In this sense, climate change is more than just an additional 
dimension to be considered by governments, enterprises and citizens. It is rapidly 
becoming a driver of change in its own right (WBGU 2008).   
Figure 1: Three waves of global change: the great global transformation towards 2050 
1st Wave: Globalisation due to lowering of barriers to flows of goods, finance, information and 
culture 
¾ trade liberalisation 
¾ rapid advances in transport and 
communication technology 
¾ competing in the global economy as an 
imperative for all national economies 
¾ integration of developing country firms 
into global value chains governed by lead 
firms in EU & US 
¾ limitation of nation states 
¾ increasing complexity and decreasing 
effectiveness of global governance 
2nd Wave: The Asian Drivers of global change … radical power shifts 
¾ acceleration of globalisation 
¾ changing global distribution of production 
and innovation capabilities 
¾ major shifts in relative prices of raw 
materials and manufactures 
¾ new power constellation 
¾ from a unipolar to a multipolar world order 
¾ shift of economic power from the West to 
the East 
3rd Wave: Climate change as a driver of global change … large scale changes in the earth system 
¾ 3.5 – 6 degree Celsius world as a threat to 
the global economy 
¾ acceleration of adaptation costs 
¾ low carbon economy and new global 
energy system needed 
¾ global development and security impacts 
¾ international distributional conflicts 
emerging 
¾ impact on many global governance arenas: 
energy, trade, migration 
¾ challenging the adaptation capacity of the 
global governance system 
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3 Developing the research agenda 
The previous section set the global context for our research. This section outlines our 
agenda for research on how the economic rise of China and India affects European 
prospects and policies. It does this by introducing the four papers produced by our 
research team and included in this publication.  
Poor and powerful 
The first paper by John Humphrey and Dirk Messner asks what is so special about China 
and India. It is easy to think of China and India as merely reinforcing existing processes of 
globalisation but this view would miss their key new feature: they are powerful due to 
their size and prolonged fast growth, but at the same time they are poor in terms of per 
capita income of the majority of the population. Because they are poor, their priorities, 
strategies and institutional capabilities are very different from those of other leading global 
actors. Their competitive threat is also very different because they can combine advanced 
technology with low wages. At the same time, these two countries differ – in particular 
with respect to their trade-GDP ratio and political systems – requiring different approaches 
from their European partners and competitors.  
While these issues have been clear for some years, European policy is struggling to come 
to terms with the new reality, searching for new mental maps and a new role in this new 
and unstable multi-polar world. Policy research has an important role to play here, 
provided it includes an understanding of the dynamics internal to China and India. In their 
paper, Humphrey and Messner begin to provide a framework for such policy research, 
focusing on the fields of innovation and climate change. The new research agenda in these 
fields is then presented in the subsequent papers.  
Key questions for research on innovation and the low-carbon economy 
Tilman Altenburg’s paper ‘New global players in innovation? China’s and India’s 
technological catch up and the low carbon economy’ identifies the following key 
questions for future research: 
– Do China’s and India’s emerging innovation capacities compete with Europe or are 
they complementary? How is this relationship changing over time?  
– What are the key mechanisms for technological catch up in China and India?  
– Does the shift to a low carbon economy strengthen Europe’s competitive advantage?  
– How likely is a European-Asian consensus with regard to global regulation in the field 
of climate change and on the way towards a global low-carbon economy?  
– What is the potential for technological cooperation between Europe and the Asian 
Drivers? 
– How can low-carbon alliances be strengthened across the European-Asian and public-
private divides?  
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Key questions for research on the dynamics of national and global climate change policies 
Imme Scholz, in her workshop paper ‘Climate change: China and India as contributors to 
problems and solutions’, presents research questions which focus on the politics of 
national and global regulation in the area of climate change. Amongst the most important 
questions are:  
– What are the political factors which determine climate change policy and 
implementation in China and India, and how are these changing?  
– Which actors advocate a proactive policy or strategy for mitigating climate change?  
– Which are the procedures for policy co-ordination? Which factors determine their 
effectiveness and how are they changing?  
– What is the potential for an EU engagement with China and India to influence these 
policy making and implementation dynamics?  
– How have China, India and the EU positioned themselves in international negotiations 
on the post-2012 regime? 
– How far are they able to shape the regime according to their expectations? Which 
interests and power constellations does the agreed regime reflect? 
How to organise the required research?  
The final paper by Hubert Schmitz asks: how can the proposed agenda be researched and 
acted upon in an effective way? Which way of organising the research is likely to yield the 
best results?  
The existing division of labour in scientific research is a major obstacle for understanding 
how the rise of China and India affects European economy, society and policy. New forms 
of interaction are needed within research, between research and policy, and between Asia 
and Europe. There is a need for:  
– bringing together those working on the internal dynamics of China and India with 
those researching the external impacts; 
– integrating different competences; integrating different disciplines and approaches; 
– observing changes through European and Asian lenses; 
– constructing common interests across the Europe-Asia and the public-private divide. 
The paper specifies the insights which can be gained from working on intersections and 
bringing together different perspectives. They are essential not just for understanding the 
new reality but also for new creative action. The paper argues that the governance of 
research and funding has a major influence on the kind of insights and findings one can 
expect. It then contrasts different ways of managing the research, highlighting strengths 
and weaknesses of the different approaches. 
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The debate 
These were the key inputs1 for the workshop in Bonn which brought together European 
and Asian researchers, policy makers and business leaders. Many other valuable 
presentations were made, available on www.die-gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/FSdakt?Open 
frameset. 
The workshop debates were insightful but it is difficult to transmit the learning processes, 
not least because these were different for different participants. There are however some 
unexpected results that can be distilled from the debate:  
– Policy makers at the workshop warned that analysing the advances of China and India 
in terms of ‘catching up’ leads to fundamental misunderstanding. These countries 
found their own way of moving forward and these need to be understood in order to 
understand the challenges for Europe. 
– Progress in bringing together the innovation and climate change agenda during the 
workshop was faster than expected given that these are still separate policy and 
research communities. Their integration was embraced by all participants, including 
the business leaders.  
– It was recognised that the strength of the research initiatives lies in working on the 
inter-connections of different problem areas. However, this was coupled with a 
warning against an overly integrated programme where everything connects with and 
depends on everything else. There was good advice to reduce complexity and find a 
way of modularising the research programme.  
– The workshop showed how quickly perceptions are changing in China and India, in 
particular with regard to priorities and policy challenges related to climate change and 
innovation. This leads to rapid changes in concrete processes of technology and policy 
development. These changes are relevant for European cooperation strategies in many 
areas, namely science and technology, development and climate change.  
The future 
The most difficult stage in a research process is not to answer questions but to pose them. 
The biggest cognitive leap lies in identifying the most relevant questions. This is what we 
sought to do in the papers brought together in this publication and the workshop which 
they fed into. The resulting research agenda is big, certainly too big for our own research 
teams and our partners in China and India. The purpose of this publication is to make the 
results of our efforts available to others keen to work with us on one of the biggest and 
most exciting construction sites in the field of policy research.  
                                                 
1 Much of the groundwork for these inputs was carried out in three previous papers: Altenburg / Schmitz / 
Stamm (2008), Gu / Humphrey / Messner (2008), Richerzhagen / Scholz (2008). 
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II Key issues and framework for policy research 
John Humphrey and Dirk Messner 
1 The Asian Drivers: changing European perceptions 
European policy has been challenged for some time by the need for global approaches to 
issues such as economic management, health, global security, migration and climate 
change. At the same time, increasing global interconnectedness has created new threats 
and opportunities for the European economy. The reduction in barriers to trade, investment 
and financial flows have opened Europe to increasing competition, but also created new 
opportunities for European firms. Within this context, the rising Asian powers in the 
global economy are a new phenomenon to be taken into consideration. European policy 
makers are rightly focusing their attention on the implication of this phenomenon for 
Europe's goals of: (i) maintaining or increasing prosperity within Europe; (ii) ensuring that 
this prosperity is sustainable, and (iii) supporting and developing multilateralism as the 
basis for global governance. 
The recognition of the relevance of the rising Asian economies for achieving these goals is 
something new. Until recently these countries were not seen as key actors in the 
formulation of responses to the challenges of globalisation. Europe, and the OECD 
countries more generally, perceived themselves as the power centres of the world 
economy and world politics. Even in the 1990s, discussions on the future of the world 
economy and of the global governance architecture turned around the concept of an 
OECD-led global order. The collapse of the Soviet Union intensified this perception of the 
Europe-US-Japan triad as the focal point of global initiatives. The mental maps and 
strategic frameworks of European governments were shaped by the idea of a world 
dominated by the West and based on the transatlantic relationship as the core of the world 
economy and of world politics.  
This orientation can be seen in various aspects of EU policy up to and beyond the 
beginning of the new century. The EU security strategy of 2003 focused on the new global 
challenges by emphasising international law as anchor of European foreign policy and 
searching for complementary roles of the EU and US superpower in a western based 
global governance system. The European debate on the future role of the European Union 
in global politics and economics has remained focused on the question of whether Europe 
could be a ‘Partner der USA auf Augenhöhe’ (equal partner) or a ‘junior partner’ of the 
US. China and India were not playing any significant role in this first European security 
and foreign policy strategy. Similarly, a document prepared by the European Commission 
for the Lisbon European Summit in March 2000 – whose focus was strengthening the 
innovation capabilities of the European economies and enabling the European Union to 
grow fast in the context of globalisation – contained 23 references to the US, one to Japan, 
and none to China, India or Asia (European Commission 2000).2  
                                                 
2 This absence of references includes variations such as Indian, Chinese etc. 
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In the past few years, perceptions of the role and importance of China and India in the 
global economy and global politics have altered radically. It is now clear that an epochal 
shift in economic and political power from the West to the East is taking place. The rise of 
China and India as drivers of the global economy and global politics is likely to be a 
defining moment of world history for much of the twenty-first century. China’s growing 
economic power is evident for all to see. Some observers argue that India might become 
even more successful than China (Rodrik / Subramanian 2004). 
The Economist is a good barometer of the transformation in perceptions. In 1999, it 
observed that “The US bestrides the globe like a colossus. It dominates business, 
commerce and communication; its economy is the world’s most successful, its military 
might second to none” (Economist 1999, 15). In 2006, it was emphasising the importance 
of the emerging economies: ‘Emerging economies are driving global growth and having a 
big impact on developed countries’ inflation, interest rates, wages and profits. As these 
newcomers become more integrated into the global economy and their incomes catch up 
with the rich countries, they will provide the biggest boost to the world economy since the 
industrial revolution’ (Economist, 2006, 3). Extrapolations of current growth trends can be 
used to show that by 2050 China and India will be the first and third largest economies in 
the world (Wilson / Purushothaman 2003). 
The emergence of China and India on the global stage creates many new challenges for 
European policy. With respect to the goal of maintaining and increasing prosperity, these 
new economies are simultaneously competitive threats and market opportunities, as was 
highlighted by Wim Kok’s Lisbon Agenda group: 
“International competition is intensifying, and Europe faces a twin challenge 
from Asia and the US. The potential rapid growth of the Chinese economy will 
create not only a new competitor to Europe, but also a vast and growing 
market. For Europe to take advantage of the opportunity, it needs to have an 
appropriate economic base, recognising that over the decades ahead 
competition in manufacturing goods … is going to be formidable. Indeed 
China, industrialising with a large and growing stock of foreign direct 
investment together with its own scientific base, has begun to compete not only 
in low but also in high value-added goods … India’s challenge is no less real 
– notably in the service sector where it is the single biggest beneficiary of the 
‘offshoring’ or ‘outsourcing’ of service sector functions with an enormous 
pool of educated, cheap, English-speaking workers. Asia’s collective presence 
in the world trading system is going to become more marked.” (High Level 
Group 2004, 12).3 
The 2004 European Competitiveness Report included a chapter on China, emphasising the 
opportunities and threats, but also arguing that the opportunities offered by China include 
the chance for European companies to improve their competitiveness by taking advantage 
of China's low costs. European firms may be able to use Chinese opportunities to maintain 
their competitiveness in the global economy (and hence sustain European living 
                                                 
3 This discussion of China and India as potential competitive threats and potential markets has the merit 
of clearly distinguishing the differences between these two countries. All too frequently, these 
differences are overlooked or downplayed in the rush to emphasise their size and rapid growth. 
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standards): “as European firms have been relocating activities to China in order to profit 
from its cost advantage [e. g. through vertical Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) carried 
out by multinationals] they have been improving their overall competitiveness vis-à-vis 
international competitors” (European Commission 2004a, 273). 
Nevertheless, this report also emphasised that the enlargement of the EU creates 
heterogeneity, with the ‘China challenge’ facing the new member states (which compete 
more directly with China in global markets) being very different to the challenge facing 
the EU 15. While the latter face the challenge of maintaining leading knowledge-based 
industries, the former face a direct challenge from China in sectors such as textiles and 
garments and electronics assembly (European Commission 2004a, 261–3). 
At the same time, the rise of China and India affects Europe's stance towards global 
governance and multilateralism. Their increasing economic and political weight means 
that they are both contributors to the problems that global governance needs to solve (for 
example, climate change, health and global financial stability) and essential contributors to 
viable solutions to these problems. As various writers have emphasised, the rise of any 
new powers that might challenge the position of the leading global power creates a 
potential for instability. Tammen / Kugler / Lemke (2000) predict from their power 
transition perspective: 
“From today’s vantage point, there are only two (great power transitions … 
on the horizon. The first is China, overtaking the United States, and the second 
… is India overtaking either China or the United States. If China and India 
develop as satisfied great powers, then these transitions will occur under 
peaceful conditions. If they develop with significant grievances against the 
international system, then these transitions could result in war.” (Tammen / 
Kugler / Lemke 2000, 42). 
The importance of these rising powers for the resolution of pressing global problems is 
seen particularly clearly in the area of climate change, which is now one of the most 
critical issues for the sustainability of European prosperity, as will be discussed further 
below.  
The overall challenge for Europe is summarised in Figure 1. The general trends of 
globalisation with respect to increasing global interconnectedness and competition, and 
the challenges that these pose for global governance have been evident since the 1980s. 
However, their characteristics, and the challenges posed for the European economy and 
European policy-making have changed decisively as a result of the emergence of new 
powers in Asia. Equally, however, this new global configuration poses challenges for the 
Asian Drivers themselves as they negotiate their way into unfamiliar territory in global 
economics and politics and have to navigate their way between the conflicting pressures 
coming from the United States and Europe.  
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Figure 1:  Implications of the Asian Drivers for European policy 
 World economy Global governance 
Globalisation in 
the 1980s and 
1990s 
Increasing interconnectedness and 
competition 
New challenges for global 
governance – whilst under US 
hegemony 
Asian Drivers in 
2000s 
New competitors in the global 
economy, new global divisions of 
labour, new bases for competition 
Increasing complexity of global 
governance, new competitors in 
global governance arenas, and the 
emergence of multi-polarity 
The remainder of this paper will outline the implications of this developing relationship 
for both the Asian Drivers and for Europe. It will highlight key research questions, 
focusing on the pressing issues of competitiveness and building a coalition to meet the 
challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The paper argues that China and India 
possess specific characteristics that make them decidedly different global economic and 
political actors from OECD countries, and that this specificity needs to be understood and 
taken into account. It then outlines the key issues around innovation, climate change and 
the interaction between the two that are the subjects of discussion at the workshop. 
Finally, the paper suggests a way of taking forward this intellectual agenda. 
2 The new challenge from China and India 
Global interconnectedness has long posed challenges for the European economy, 
particularly with respect to industrial restructuring. Large parts of Europe have had to 
reinvent themselves in the face of increasing global competition, from both advanced 
countries (notably, Japan) and from low-income countries that have become the new 
workshops of the world for labour-intensive products. This process has been going on 
since the 1960s (see, for example, Fröbel / Heinrichs / Kreye 1980) and became 
particularly acute and visible in the stagflationary period of the 1970s. The European 
Union policy itself has encouraged this competition and the restructuring it created 
through devices such as the Outward Processing Trade (OPT) mechanism and its waves of 
expansion to the South (the Iberian Peninsula and Greece) and later to Eastern Europe. 
The strategy adopted by the higher-income countries has been to adopt the knowledge-
economy model, emphasising the need to promote innovation and knowledge-based 
industries in order to sustain competitiveness.4 
The fact that new countries are taking their place in the global economy is not itself the 
novelty of the current period. Fifty years ago Japan was developing rapidly. Thirty years 
ago South Korea began to emerge as a rapidly growing East Asian economy that posed 
new challenges, and new opportunities, for Western firms. The consequences of their 
rapid growth for Europe and North America were substantial – not only for the European 
industries that found it difficult to compete (automobiles, televisions), but also for the 
European industries that responded to this new competitive threat by offshoring and 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of European innovation policy, see Huang / Soete (2007). 
Hubert Schmitz and Dirk Messner (eds) 
 German Development Institute 12 
outsourcing. The new international division of labour was, in large part, a response to 
these new competitors.5 New global competitors do emerge from time to time. 
Similarly, the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence created by globalisation 
processes has been putting strain on the institutions of global governance for a long time. 
Interconnectedness increases the possibility of contagion – in areas as diverse as severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and financial markets. New challenges arise which 
can no longer be managed within the confines of nations, or even regions. Again, such 
trends have been visible for a long time and were discussed globally after the publication 
of the Global Governance Report, prepared by the Commission on Global Governance in 
1995. But until very recently western actors have been seen as the major drivers of global 
governance processes. Now, China and India seem to significantly change the rules of the 
game in global policy making. 
3 What is so special about China and India? 
In this context, it is easy to think of the rise of China and India as reinforcing existing 
processes of globalisation. But China and India do not merely represent ‘more of the 
same’, but rather they are a significant new phenomenon for four reasons. First, they are 
both increasingly powerful/influential and competitive, although they choose to exercise 
this influence and also compete in the global economy in different ways. China and 
India’s size means that their economic impact is, and will be, that much bigger than was 
the case for South Korea or Singapore. This is particularly the case for China, which 
displays the unusual combination of considerable size and a high ratio of trade to gross 
domestic product (GDP). This size aspect also has consequences for other countries. For 
example, in discourses on global warming it is the total quantity of actual and projected 
greenhouse gas emissions from India and China that demand attention. Similarly, China's 
large size means that its exports and imports have a clear impact on global prices.6 
Second, these two big countries are still poor. Because they are poor, their priorities, 
strategies and institutional capabilities are very different to those of other leading global 
actors, and their competitive threat is also different. With respect to economic and political 
priorities, sustaining rapid growth is a high priority for both China and India. This has 
direct implications for the shape of any future commitments to emissions reductions, and 
also the domestic political sustainability of the implementation of any such deal in these 
countries.7 And although the resource use and greenhouse gas emissions of both China 
and India as still poor countries are much lower than those of the OECD countries, they 
are both inevitably involved in developing global solutions to global problems because 
their great size means that in absolute terms they are a significant part of the climate 
                                                 
5 In this respect, it is worth noting that the pioneer of outsourcing in the American electronics industry, 
Fairchild, took the decision to relocate assembly of semiconductors to Hong Kong as early as 1961, and 
in response to the growing threat to the US semiconductor industry from Japanese manufacturers 
(Grunwald / Flamm 1985). This is an early example of how an established economic power can use 
relocation to Asia to maintain competitiveness in the face of new challengers. 
6 The impact of China's demand for resources on global commodity prices is well-known. Equally, 
China's exports have noticeable impacts on global prices for manufactured goods (Kaplinsky 2006). 
7 One of the lessons of the Kyoto Agreement is that implementation of commitments made on climate 
change is also a political and economic challenge for all signatories. 
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change equation. The complexity arising from poverty combined with size and influence 
has been noted by Leadbeater / Wilsdon (2007) in their analysis of Asian innovation. They 
choose the term ‘hall of mirrors’ to denote how China and India (and South Korea) looked 
very different when viewed from different perspectives. 
With respect to the competitiveness challenge to Europe coming from these two countries, 
their low incomes create a challenge not only for the manufacturing industries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, but increasingly to the knowledge-based industries of Western 
Europe. What makes this challenge specific is that China and India, while still poor, are 
acquiring the science and technology skills to compete with Europe in innovation-
intensive industries, and given the large scale of their investments in human resources and 
state support for industrial upgrading, they will be competitive threats. 
Third, both countries are non-western societies, with distinct cultural and political 
backgrounds, and precisely because they are non-western countries, it is more difficult for 
western scholars to understand the academic and political discourses taking place in these 
countries. At the same time, the encounter of these countries with the West in global fora 
is likely to change the perspectives and positions of both sides quite quickly, lending a 
dynamic element to the interaction. We see with China, for example, that debates on 
international relations, global governance, political philosophy and business management 
concepts are not structured along the well established paths of western theory building in 
these fields (see Gu / Humphrey / Messner 2007). Therefore, the scope for misunder-
standing (between academics, but even more important, political decision makers) is huge.  
Fourth, the simultaneous rise of China and India confronts Europe with two emerging 
Asian global players, who compete with each other regarding the supremacy in Asia (and 
with other Asian regional powers) and who are developing very different patterns of 
regional cooperation (in economic and political terms). This makes their advance different 
from the rise of the US at the beginning of the twentieth century or of Japan in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The rise of China and India could furthermore – beyond the respective impact 
of each of these countries on global dynamics – imply a general shift towards Asia (Dollar 
2007).  
To sum up, China and India are a new type of global competitor. They are becoming 
economic powerhouses, and they increasingly have capacity to mobilise and provide 
leadership for other developing countries through organisations such as the G20 and G77.8 
As they develop the capacity to define agendas for global governance and to give voice to 
their concerns and the concerns of other developing countries, they translate their 
economic power into political influence in multiple arenas of global governance.  
                                                 
8 Recognising that this increased leadership role does not by any means suggest that China and India will 
not face difficulties and challenges in their relationships with other developing countries. This is already 
evident in some parts of Africa, as well as in the strained relationships that both countries have with 
their near neighbours. 
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4 The challenge for Europe 
We are going through a very special period of global change. Given their size and their 
dynamic development, China and India are the only actors worldwide that have the 
potential to challenge western dominance in global affairs or even US hegemony. Once 
the Asian Drivers establish their global role, the probability of further power transitions at 
the global level diminish dramatically. This creates radically new challenges for Europe. 
The challenges involve not only the formulation of new strategies for the emerging new 
world order, but also developing the capacity to make informed choices. More 
specifically: 
1. Outcomes are not determined. In the current period of transition from the unipolar 
domination of the United States towards a multipolar (potentially bipolar China-United 
States) world, Europe has the capacity to make a difference in outcomes through the 
way that it contributes to the overall management of the transition, and the resolution 
of particular global governance challenges. 
2. In devising its policies in this field, Europe has to recognise that it competes with these 
countries both economically and politically, but also needs to collaborate with them in 
the pursuit of mutual goals. It now has to develop a similar complex relationship with 
China and India, but one in which the partner countries have different priorities to 
those of the established powers.  
Finding a fruitful basis for collaboration that enhances rather than undermines European 
welfare and competitiveness and drawing these countries into collaboration over the 
production of global public goods are major challenges. At the same time it is crucial to 
understand that the competitiveness-collaboration dynamic is different to that for Europe 
in relation to the United States and Japan given the specific characteristics of China and 
India spelled out above. At the same time, Europe has a strong interest in drawing these 
countries into collaboration over the production of global public goods, but once again, the 
challenges are different to those seen in relation to the OECD countries.  
5 How significant is the rise of Asia, and in what ways? 
It is worth emphasising that different and conflicting views still remain about the 
significance of the Asian Drivers. At present, at least three different perceptions on the 
consequences of the rise of China and India for Europe (and the OECD countries in 
general) can be distinguished: 
1. Zürn (2007) emphasises the continuing poverty and weakness of China and India, 
arguing that there is no real power shift and that in terms of both global governance 
and innovation and competitiveness, the future impact of China and India is wildly 
overestimated. The defining relationship will remain that between Europe and the 
United States. This view is also shared by writers such as Hutton (2007), who 
emphasise the weakness of China's development and the great potential for an 
economic crisis.  
2. Mearsheimer (2004), in contrast, emphasises the size and potential future impact of 
these economies, and sees their simultaneous rise as representing a fundamental power 
shift towards Asia. Mearsheimer (2001), in common with many ‘neo-realist’ 
international relations specialists (Susbielle 2006), argues that the rise of China, in 
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particular, will lead to conflicts, fierce competition, fragmentation of the world 
economy and a global inability to respond to issues such as climate change. Global 
governance will be paralysed by the ‘tragedy of great power politics’ (Mearsheimer 
2001) and by the difficulties of transition from current US global hegemony to a 
multipolar world.  
3. In contrast to these two positions, Kupchan (Kupchan / Adler / Coicaud 2001) accepts 
that the rise of new global powers does create problems and challenges for those 
nations whose dominance is threatened, but he argues that increasing interdependence 
between nations raises the possibility of joint solutions, although the cultural gap 
between the Asian powers and Europe and the United States creates particular 
problems. This underlines the need for greater understanding and exchange of views 
between the rising and established powers. Strategies to create preconditions for a 
peaceful power transition and to help the emerging and the established powers to 
perceive each other as benign are urgently needed. 
The uniqueness of the emergence of the ‘poor but powerful’ new global powers lies 
precisely in the peculiarity of the situation as culturally and economically different, but 
increasingly important for Europe. Understanding not only the positioning of these powers 
within the global economy and global politics, but also the rapidly changing mosaic of 
domestic and external factors that influence this positioning is essential if Europe is to 
engage with these new powers in a constructive manner. Given the characteristics of these 
countries as both relatively poor and late comers to the global economy, the tools and 
experience of development studies and development research are particularly pertinent to 
this task.  
6 Global governance, climate change and innovation 
Within the broad range of issues around which Europe needs to engage with and 
understand better China and India (and also to formulate more clearly its own policies and 
strategic interests), we have chosen to focus on two specific topics for this workshop: 
innovation and climate change. This is done for four reasons: 
1. These two areas are a high priority for Europe: innovation, because it is the key to 
continuing competitiveness and because global governance capabilities are based on 
the innovation capacities of nations; and climate change, because Europe has 
understood the severity of this problem and needs to play an active role in securing 
global progress on this issue.  
2. They are areas where the fact that China and India are still poor has particular 
consequences for Europe, as will be explained below.  
3. These areas bring into relief the complexities of the competition-cooperation 
challenge. 
4. There are important areas where these two issues interact with each other.  
Figure 2 summarises the relationship between these two themes, trends in the global 
governance architecture and the rise of the Asian Drivers. Cells 1–3 of the figure identify 
the ways in which globalisation processes in general impact upon the global governance 
architecture, climate change and innovation. These form the general context within which 
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the proposed research programme is located. In the second row of the figure, Cells 4–6 
identify the specific ways in which the Asian Drivers bring new issues into these three 
areas. These are the areas of major interest for our research programme. The new 
challenges for global governance (Cell 4) are also part of the overall context within which 
the EU and the Asian Drivers will develop their relationships in the coming years. Cell 5 
focuses on the issues for climate change arising specifically from the increasing salience 
of the Asian Drivers, while Cell 6 identifies the challenges to Europe from the rising 
innovation potential of China and India and its implications for European competitiveness, 
particularly in knowledge-based industries. The bottom line of the figure (Cells 7 and 8) 
identifies two key interfaces — between climate change and shifts in the global 
governance architecture, and between climate change and innovation – as specific foci for 
future research. 
Figure 2: Linkages from globalisation and Asian drivers to global governance, 
innovation and climate change 
Drivers Global governance Climate change Innovation 
Globalisation 1. New challenges to 
governance arising from 
increasing interconnected-
ness on multiple levels. 
2. Globalisation has begun 
to incorporate and see 
rapid growth in major 
population centres, 
exacerbating and com-
plicating the climate 
change issue. 
3. New international 
division of labour 
and rise of 
manufacturing in 
developing 
countries. 
Asian Drivers 4. New actors in global 
governance. Issues of 
power shifts and 
interests. 
5. Climate change initi-
atives have to involve 
the new powers and 
recognise their needs 
and motivations (eco-
nomic and political). 
6. Rising innovation 
potential for 
China and India 
challenges 
European compe-
tetiveness in 
knowledge-inten-
sive activities, but 
also creates new 
opportunities. 
Interfaces 7. Post-Kyoto; impacts on various 
global governance arenas (like 
energy and trade policies); high time 
pressure; new lines of conflict and 
interest constellations in global 
politics. 
8. Transition towards a global low 
carbon economy needed; global 
climate policies as an incentive 
scheme for innovation processes; 
adaptation strategies for developing 
countries are key (China and India 
included); new long wave of 
innovation possible.  
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7 Innovation 
Innovation has a central place in European debates on competitiveness. Although many 
factors contribute to competitiveness (such as the regulatory environment, energy policy, 
etc.), Europe’s capacity to be inventive is an important part of this process:  
“In a remarkably short period of time, economic globalisation has changed 
the world economic order, bringing new opportunities and new challenges. In 
this new economic order, Europe cannot compete unless it becomes more 
inventive, reacts better to consumer needs and preferences and innovates 
more.” (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 1). 
As Huang / Soete (2007) point out, however, this view of innovation is curiously inward-
looking – it focuses on Europe’s capabilities rather than analysing the global 
competitiveness challenges Europe faces and how Europe will collaborate and compete 
with other global economic powers. If there is a challenge from competitor countries in 
the world, then the response has to be to improve the efficiency and productivity of the 
European economies and to invest more in innovation and more in translating innovation 
into the competitiveness of industry. 
Such challenges certainly exist, particularly from China. For low-value manufacturing 
products, the threat is beyond doubt. Within a broader Asian context, the competitive 
challenge is even more severe. For many products, China is the endpoint of a production 
system spanning many countries in Asia.9  The key issue, however, is the implications of 
competition from China and India in the production of higher-value products. To what 
extent will increasing export of technology-intensive products threaten European 
competitiveness and livelihoods? 
Without doubt, there are some Chinese firms that are direct competitive threats to 
European companies. The high-profile ones are companies such as Lenovo and Huawei. 
Less obvious, but equally interesting, is the case of China International Marine Containers 
Group (CIMC), described by Zeng and Williamson. This company now has 55 per cent 
global market share for shipping containers, and far from focusing on low-end products, it 
also competes in segments such as refrigerated containers, containers with electronic 
tracking, folding containers, etc., and according to Zeng and Williamson: “In 2005 it 
bought up 77 patents from a bankrupt competitor Graaff – ironically the German firm 
from which CMIC licensed its first refrigeration technology back in 1995. One year 
earlier it acquired a 60 percent shareholding in Clive-Smith Cowley, the British company 
that invented the proprietary ‘Domino’ technology that allows empty containers to be 
‘folded’ for ease of back-hauling” (Zeng / Williamson 2007, 3). 
Such competitive threats are enhanced by the Chinese government's promotion of the 
upgrading of Chinese firms through policies such as protecting the domestic market, 
actively promoting selected industries (notably the electronics industry) through tax 
incentives and making technology transfer to Chinese companies a condition for foreign 
investment in some sectors (European Commission 2004b, 258). In addition to this, the 
                                                 
9 See, for example, the analyses of Ng / Yeats (2003) and Ando (2005). See also Humphrey / Schmitz 
(2007). 
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problem of weak protection for intellectual property rights in China is well-known. Not 
surprisingly, the EU has raised the intellectual property rights issue and the question of 
China's World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments in response to these policies 
(European Commission 2004b, 8).  
Equally important, however, are the investments by foreign enterprises in both 
manufacturing capacity and, increasingly innovation, in China. As the 2004 European 
Competitiveness Report notes, European companies invest in China, exporting capital 
equipment and importing manufactured products. Increasingly, they are also locating 
innovation activities in China, as are transnational companies from other parts of the 
world. The reason for doing this is, in part, to be close to manufacturing facilities, to be 
close to what is a fast growing market, and, possibly, to take advantage of lower wage 
costs. The report suggests that “European engineering industries can be attractive 
partners active in the industrialisation of China.” (European Commission 2004a, 268). 
So, as is suggested in Cell 6 of Figure 2, China and India are valuable sources of cost-
competitive products and valuable markets for EU exports, but equally actual and 
potential future competitors, with European firms contributing to this increasing 
competitiveness. Furthermore, China and India can be seen as both potentially valuable 
markets for European innovations, but also simultaneously as a medium to long-term 
threat to the technological advantage of European companies, both through the increasing 
capacities of Asian competitors/partners, and also because of the issues of weak protection 
for intellectual property rights.  
So, for Europe, the goal has to be to explore the opportunities of the Chinese and Indian 
markets, and to sustain the competitiveness of knowledge-intensive industries in Europe, 
including by outsourcing some knowledge activities that can be better done in Asia, in the 
same way that the lifespans of more traditional industries in developed countries were 
extended through outsourcing of low-value activities. Similarly, the challenge for 
European companies is to find ways to engage in strategic partnerships with firms in 
China and India (maximising the benefits of collaboration), while minimising the real risk 
of creating strong competitors that absorb and learn from European technology and 
possess substantial cost advantages in innovation. Experience so far suggests that this is a 
very difficult challenge. 
Clearly, an element of European policy with respect to innovation will be the ‘adequate 
protection of intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights and trademarks’ 
(European Commission 2004b, 8), as well as access to the Chinese and Indian markets and 
the compliance these countries' industrial promotion policies with WTO rules. In other 
words, global governance questions to be pursued in fora such as the WTO and World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) will be issues for concern. However, in this 
context, the issues of competitive strategies and capabilities at the enterprise level, both of 
European firms and firms in China and India (and, of course, joint ventures) are probably 
more important. Therefore, the key issues to be addressed in this work package concern: 
A. The extent to which Chinese and Indian firms are acquiring innovation capabilities and 
the opportunities and threats that this offers to European firms – as suppliers of 
technology, as strategic partners and as competitors in final markets. 
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B. The key mechanisms for technological catch up in China and India and how they see 
competition and complementarity with Europe and European firms.  
C. The strategies of leading innovating European firms with respect to their operations in 
China and India. 
8 Climate change 
There are two main packages of work on climate change. The first is concerned with the 
issues highlighted in Cell 5 of Figure 2. The ‘needs and motivations’ referred to have two 
distinct aspects. The first relates to emissions, growth and poverty. A better understanding 
of these differences between the specific challenges for Europe and for China and India in 
negotiating and implementing any future deals on climate change (as well as devising and 
implementing the many other possible climate change initiatives that will complement any 
global deal) will be essential if Europe is to engage effectively with these new powers. 
The specificity of their situation has ramifications in many fields, ranging from the 
scramble for reliable energy sources (which has brought China into the spotlight because 
of its search for oil in Africa, but which is increasingly an important element of Indian 
foreign policy, including engagement with African countries) to a reluctance to make 
binding commitments on greenhouse gas emissions reductions.  
China and India are now important global greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters. There will be 
no feasible deal on climate change without their participation. Without their inclusion, a 
deal would not be politically sustainable in Europe either. For China and India, however, 
the increasing acceptance that climate change will have serious impact on their own 
societies as well as their economies and that a global response has to involve them, has to 
be balanced against the overriding need to sustain rapid rates of economic growth for both 
poverty reduction and social and political stability. Therefore, sustaining growth, but in a 
more carbon-efficient manner, is the challenge facing these countries. Both countries face 
a very difficult task in switching from carbon-intensive manufacturing and power 
generation to low carbon alternatives. This point is discussed further later in this paper. 
The second aspect of the ‘needs and motivations’ concerns the way in which the political 
actors in both countries are able to manage the difficulties that climate change 
commitments will create. Even if elites accept in principle the need for action – and there 
are signs that they do – there are two major, and linked, challenges: (i) translating 
principles into practical, implementable policies, and (ii) politically sustaining the 
momentum for change. The first of these means translating abstract commitments into 
tangible and implementable policies and policy instruments. This has been and is still a 
challenge for some European countries, but Europe both needs to understand the 
constraints that policy makers face in both China and India, the differences between the 
two countries,10 and the potential for European support for change.  
                                                 
10 On this issue, the differences in political systems between the two really matters. Indian elites face 
political competition. The Chinese elite does not face open political competition, but it does have 
difficulty in imposing its political will on lower layers of government, and climate change initiatives 
will have to be implemented at multiple levels. 
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The second package of work is derived from Cell 7 of Figure 2: the interface between 
global governance and climate change. At the heart of the issue is the potential for climate 
change to act as a driver of new distributional conflicts between the motors of climate 
change and those developing countries that will mainly be affected by its consequences, as 
a driver of new North-South-tensions, and as a driver of new types of international 
security risks (WBGU 2007). The potential for such conflict is amply demonstrated by the 
‘hall of mirrors’ element of greenhouse gas emissions. Figure 3 shows that China and 
India are still firmly among the low GHG emitters per capita, but it is equally well-known 
that they will be major contributors to increases in emissions over the next quarter century, 
as shown in Figure 4, highlighting the complexity of the ‘poor but powerful’ conundrum.  
Figure 3: CO2 Emissions, 2002 
 
Source: World Bank, online database, 2004 
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Figure 4: Projected emissions growth, 2004-30 
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Source: IEA (2005): World Energy Outlook Papers (map produced by WBGU) 
Nevertheless, it is also true that China and India have much to lose from global solutions 
not being found for global problems. First, poor people in poor countries are 
disproportionately affected by both the impact of climate change and the costs of adapting 
to it. Second, these two countries do wish to be seen as good global citizens, particularly 
with respect to their leadership and responsibilities in relation to other developing 
countries.11 There are already signs that China is willing to concede that it has 
responsibilities for responding to the climate change challenge that are different to those 
of the least developed countries. From a European and Asian Drivers perspective, climate 
change could be perceived as a joint external threat, creating incentives for both sides to 
make reconciliation and cooperation an attractive option.  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conference in 
Bali in December 2007 provided a clear indication of the complexity of global governance 
processes around climate change. The EU supported developing country demands for 
more resources for climate change adaptation, marking a clear divergence of opinion with 
the United States. At the same time, the Association of Small Island States and many 
African States raised concerns about the consequences of failing to agree a climate change 
roadmap, which in many respects are different to those of China and India. This 
constellation asks for new patterns of cooperation between Europe and the Asian Drivers 
in the field of climate related policies. 
The key questions for the work packages on climate change are: 
A. What is the potential for an EU engagement with China and India to influence these 
policy-making and implementation dynamics? What are the major differences between 
                                                 
11 In this respect, it is noteworthy that China, in spite of promptings from both the European Union and the 
United States, has not broken with the G20 on the course of the Doha Round negotiations, even though 
it might be considered to have ‘objective interests’ closer to those of the industrialised countries. 
Similarly, China's self-presentation to African countries is based on the notion that it is a country that 
has more in common with Africa than the developed nations. 
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China and India on climate change issues, and how will this affect climate change 
negotiations and relations with Europe?  
B. What are the institutional, economic and political factors which determine climate 
change policy and implementation in China and India, and how are these changing?  
C. To what extent does our four-fold characterisation of the specificity of the Asian 
Drivers identify the key factors and dynamics in the climate policy arena?  
D. How do we map the debates on diverging macro scenarios for global governance and 
Asian Drivers on to climate change issues? Is the climate policy arena a favourable 
one to avoid conflictive dynamics between the EU and the Asian Drivers, to build 
common interests, and to create pillars for strategic partnership? 
E. What are the critical areas for European policy around global governance and climate 
change over the next five years?  
9 Innovation and climate change  
Cell 8 of Figure 2 identified the interaction between climate change and innovation as a 
central element of any future research programme. This arises directly from the position of 
the Asian Drivers as countries whose economic and political priority is to sustain growth 
and poverty reduction. It follows that the only way to square the circle between containing 
levels of increases in greenhouse gas emissions and sustaining growth is to move these 
economies (and the European ones) radically towards low carbon economies. Furthermore 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Reports published in 2007 made 
clear that a reduction of GHG by 50 per cent globally is needed until 2050 in order to 
avoid a dangerous global climate change. This means that radical innovations towards a 
global low carbon economy are an indispensable element of any global climate policy.  
This has implications for the post-Kyoto climate change regime, which will have to deal 
with issues like technology transfer and a global carbon trading system, as an incentive 
mechanism for global innovation processes towards a low carbon economy. Therefore, it 
makes sense to bring together global governance, climate change and innovation experts 
from Europe, China and India in one research programme.  
But, as innovation specialists and analysts of enterprise-level adoption and adaptation of 
new technologies and innovation have long known, the process of diffusing technologies 
and promoting their incorporation into a wide range of products is a complex one. Low-
carbon growth for China and India will involve innovation and the implementation of the 
results of innovation in products used in a range of different sectors, including power 
generation, construction, transport and chemicals. It will also involve improving energy 
efficiency across a range of different industries. Researchers that have experience of 
enterprise-level, cluster and global value chain adaptation of new technologies in countries 
that are late comers to the global economy have particular skills which are relevant to this 
issue. 
It will become clear that global incentive schemes towards a low carbon economy within 
the post Kyoto regime, national innovation policies in China and India triggering into the 
same direction and European initiatives towards the Asian Drivers in this area will be 
needed in order to find solutions to the climate change challenges. The interaction between 
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climate, global governance and innovation specialists will be helpful to understand better 
the interactions between climate change and innovation processes, to integrate innovation 
policies effectively unto global climate policies and to consider climate change challenges 
as major objectives within national and international innovation strategies. 
European firms have a role to play in this process, as they are, and can be, leaders in many 
climate related economic sectors. Furthermore they are also confronted with the challenge 
to transform their fossil based economies into low carbon economies. But, the innovation 
issues around intellectual property rights and future competition from China and India also 
arise. These countries are capable of catching up, possibly surpassing, Europe in some low 
carbon oriented innovation fields. Again the questions of the speed of the Asian Drivers 
learning processes, the impacts of those on Europe and the scope for strategic cooperation 
emerge. This poses particular problems for Europe. On the one hand, Europe has an 
interest in promoting the diffusion of technology, particularly in the area of climate 
change, both for the results in terms of carbon emissions, and also because of the market 
opportunities that it presents the European firms.  
Our research programme will focus on four central questions: 
A. Are China and India catching up in sectors and innovation fields that are key from a 
low carbon economy perspective?  
B. Would a shift to a low carbon economy strengthen Europe's competitive advantage? 
C. Which kind of impacts will these processes have on Europe (new markets, new 
competitors, new partners in the field of global climate change)? Which kind of 
strategic partnership between Europe and the Asian Drivers should emerge in these 
arenas?  
D. What is the potential for technology cooperation around low carbon growth between 
Europe and the Asian Drivers, and how might low carbon alliances be strengthened 
across the European-Asian and public-private divides? 
10 Moving forwards 
A meeting held recently in Brussels between China, Africa and the EU explicitly called 
for more research and interaction between scholars in order to “improve mutual 
understanding, identify a first set of possible ways to cooperate in a trilateral setting 
based on an African agenda and propose a constructive agenda between the EU and 
China on the one hand and take up African priorities in common on the other hand.” 
(Wissenbach 2007, 1). The meeting concluded that there was a:  
“Strong shared feeling that there is a great need for better knowledge on 
China in Africa and of Africa in China. Actions to be considered: disseminate 
information/studies, promote exchanges between researchers … any initiative 
in the field of research should involve at least two or three African research 
centres from countries of different levels of development, plus Chinese and 
European research ones.” (Wissenbach 2007, 8). 
The same could be said of the need for further research and further interaction between 
scholars in China, India and EU on the issues of climate change and innovation.  
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These issues are not ones that can simply be decided in discussions between elites about 
long-term strategy or immediate policy priorities. Decisions in both of these areas are 
likely to have consequences – distributional, fiscal, sectoral, etc. Difficult adjustments will 
have to be made. Therefore, the development of a broad understanding on these issues 
between Europe, China and India (including, very importantly dialogue between the latter 
two, as they are in many ways very distinct) will require an increased understanding of 
different constellations of interest in each society, the differential impact of particular 
policy initiatives across the three areas, and a sophisticated understanding of the political 
as well as economic sustainability of initiatives.  
Therefore, this means developing research networks bringing together European and 
Asian Driver researchers, and in particular bringing into this network expertise in 
understanding the specific challenges that arise from the position of China and India as 
‘poor but powerful’. These countries are quite different from both the OECD countries 
with respect to their needs and strategies, and also increasingly different from other low- 
and middle-income countries in the global economy. It is also clear that the development 
of policies around innovation, climate change and global governance by China and India 
will have consequences for other developing countries, and competence in the analysis of 
this relationship is also one that researchers equipped with the tools of development 
studies can offer. Suggestions for how such a network might be structured are made in the 
final paper of this publication. 
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III New global players in innovation? China’s and India’s technological 
catch-up and the low carbon economy 
Tilman Altenburg 
1 Introduction 
The Asian Drivers – China and India – are of particular importance for Europe with regard 
to two issues:  
First, they are rapidly upgrading their science, technology and innovation capacities. In 
some fields they are likely to catch up soon with Europe. This gives rise to both 
opportunities and threats for Europe. On the one hand, it means bigger export markets and 
lower prices in home markets. More knowledge-based patterns of development in China 
and India are likely to sustain their economic growth for a longer period and expand 
markets for European products. Furthermore, European import prices for more 
sophisticated goods and services may decrease, benefiting consumers as well as European 
firms that source from the Asian Drivers. Furthermore scientific networks will gain from 
enhanced research capabilities, especially taking the size of both countries’ research 
communities into account. On the other hand, some European industries and professions 
will be threatened, because not only low- and medium-skill activities will face the new 
competition, but increasingly also knowledge-intensive activities, e. g. in mechanical 
engineering, software development and pharmaceuticals.  
The challenge affects European nations differently. The threats are more immediate for 
many of the new EU member states whose factor endowments are similar to those of the 
Asian Drivers and who are embarking on similar strategies, e. g. attracting FDI in 
automotive assembly and IT services, or producing labour intensive consumer goods. But 
also the more innovative Western European countries need to respond to the challenges 
posed by the Asian Drivers, e. g. by stepping up their innovation efforts to constantly 
renew their competitive advantages, and by taking advantage of new opportunities to 
organise global value chains. In a nutshell, how fast and in which areas China and India 
catch up matters for all European countries. There is a need to get a better understanding 
of what happens ‘inside’ the Asian Drivers with regard to science, technology and 
innovation, and to rethink the Lisbon Agenda from this perspective.  
Second, the Asian Drivers have become important energy consumers and polluters, and 
therefore obligatory partners in the search for solutions for climate change. Although per 
capita energy consumption and GHG emissions are still low by European standards, China 
and India together account for 72 per cent of the anticipated increase in global coal 
consumption between 2004 and 2030,12 and will become leading greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emitters. In order to halt global warming it is therefore imperative to involve both 
countries in the search for global collaborative coping strategies. Such strategies 
necessarily need to build on action on two fronts:  
                                                 
12  Energy Information Administration (2007). 
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a) negotiations on climate change burden-sharing and the creation of global institutions 
for managing GHG reductions; and  
b) the collaborative pursuit of technological innovations.  
Both are strongly interdependent, as global institutions are setting incentives for research 
and innovation, while technological achievements allow for more ambitious political 
targets.   
The pursuit of technological solutions for climate change is closely related to the catch-up 
process. Both Europe and the Asian Drivers need to abandon long established 
technological paradigms and shift towards a low carbon economy, with far reaching 
implications across all sector and fields of technology development. The speed at which 
countries manage to reform their economic incentive regimes and develop low carbon 
technologies will shape their future competitive advantages. Both Europe and the Asian 
Drivers are embarking on the necessary reforms, but along different trajectories, given the 
existing differences in per capita incomes, social values, innovation capabilities, political 
pressure, etc. Europe’s industry is more advanced in this respect and may exploit a first-
mover advantage vis-à-vis the Asian Drivers. But new technological paradigms also open 
up opportunities for leapfrogging that may benefit newcomers. The fact that both China 
and India are currently growing at roughly 10 per cent per annum allows them to 
modernise facilities at a fast pace and to reap enormous scale economies. Hence the 
competitiveness of European nations and the Asian Drivers will in all probability be 
affected, but we do not yet know how.  
The challenge for Europe is to advance global climate governance and technological 
innovations for climate change without sacrificing its competitiveness. DIE and IDS will 
therefore organise their future ‘Asian Drivers’ research agenda around the following 
issues: The Asian Drivers as: 
1. emerging competitors and partners in technology and innovation, with special 
emphasis on the ‘low carbon transition’; and  
2. emerging competitors and partners in dealing with climate change.  
The present paper13 explores the first of these issues, i.e. whether and at what velocity 
China and India are likely to emerge as new global players in technology and innovation; 
how they respond to the need for a paradigm change towards the low carbon economy; 
and what this twin challenge – the emerging low carbon paradigm shift and the increasing 
innovativeness of Chinese and Indian industries – means for Europe in terms of market 
expansion and competition. Furthermore it discusses why it is so difficult to assess the 
twin challenge, pointing to the peculiarities of China and India as large, poor and non-
Western countries, and justifying the need for a collaborative research agenda to explore 
these peculiarities. The paper concludes by addressing challenges for European 
policymakers and identifying key researchable questions for the future work of DIE and 
IDS on the Asian Drivers as ‘new global players in innovation’. 
                                                 
13 A complementary conference paper, presented by Imme Scholz, deals with the second issue: climate 
change governance.  
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2 Will China and India emerge as new global players in technology and 
innovation?   
Within just two decades, China has emerged as a new hub in the world economy and will 
soon be the leading exporter. With a sustained rate of economic growth of about 10 per 
cent per annum for almost two decades, an increasing trade/GDP ratio and continuous 
attractiveness for FDI, China’s role in the global economy is constantly increasing. India’s 
economic boom is more recent (with more than 8 per cent annually since 2003), and the 
number of globally competitive industries is still quite limited. However its performance 
in the software industry is outstanding and some other industries (e. g. pharmaceuticals, 
automotive, steel) are also developing dynamically. Both countries have made some 
progress in shifting from standardised manufacturing and outsourced low-cost activities to 
building knowledge-based competitive advantages (Altenburg / Schmitz / Stamm 2008). 
The questions raised are thus: Will the two countries be able to further reduce, or even 
close, the technological gap separating them from more technologically advanced 
European countries? Will the future division of labour be based on complementarities that 
benefit all trading partners, or will Europe’s competitive advantages and levels of welfare 
erode?  
The catch up process, although starting from a very low level, is unprecedented. This is 
particularly true for China, which increased its share of high-technology exports in total 
exports from 7.9 to 29.9 per cent between 1996 and 2005 (OECD 2007, 14). China is now 
spending 1.3 per cent of its GDP on research and development (R&D), having doubled 
this percentage in less than 10 years. In absolute terms, China is already one of the biggest 
spenders on R&D worldwide and spending increases much faster than in the EU.14 The 
number of researchers is at the same level as that of the EU25 and second only to that of 
the United States (Huang / Soete 2007, 9). In 2004 there were around half a million 
postgraduates in science, medicine and engineering, with a strong upward tendency 
(Wilsdon / Keeley 2007, 4). In addition, multinational corporations increasingly shift 
knowledge-based operations to China and have established about 750 R&D centres within 
a few years (UNCTAD 2005). Likewise, the number of Chinese firms among the top 500 
companies of the world is increasing rapidly, reaching 24 in 2007 (Fortune Global 500 
2007). Huawei Technologies, Lenovo, the Haier Group and many others are rapidly going 
global, purchasing established Western companies and establishing their own global 
brand, thereby challenging established companies in the EU (European Commission 2004, 
272).15  
India is much less advanced and has a less aggressive science, technology and innovation 
(STI) strategy (Krishnan 2007) – e. g. R&D spending has stagnated at around 0.8 per cent 
since the 1990s – but has nevertheless upgraded remarkably within the last two decades. 
The strongest factor here is investment in human capital. Each year 350,000 engineering 
graduates are released to the labour market (Bound 2007, 9). India also benefits strongly 
from return migration of highly qualified Indians from the US. Furthermore, large private 
                                                 
14 30 billion US$ if current exchange rates are used, or 115 billion US$ if calculated on the basis of 
purchasing power parities, in 2005. Depending on the calculations, China is the sixth or the second 
largest R&D spender worldwide. R&D spending increased at 19 % per annum since 1995 (OECD 2007, 
23).  
15  See also Boston Consulting Group (2006). 
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corporations such as the Tata Group, ArcelorMittal, Infosys and Suzlon Energy have 
recently enhanced their roles as global players and leaders in innovation. These companies 
often accessed their cutting edge technologies through international exposure and 
acquisitions of European and American firms. Six Indian companies have already made it 
to the global top 500 (Fortune Global 500 2007).  
Despite their rapid progress, the level of technological development, both in China and in 
India, is still low compared to most European nations, in particular the old industrialised 
Western European countries. With very few exceptions, neither China nor India are yet 
challenging European cutting edge innovations. The number of patents granted by the US 
and EU to Chinese and Indian firms is still insignificant (Altenburg / Schmitz / Stamm 
2008). In the case of China, foreign invested corporations account for more than half of its 
export (2005), and research-intensive high value added products are still largely imported 
(ibid.). Hence it is unclear to what extent knowledge-based production and innovation 
from Chinese territory really reflect the performance of its own innovation system.  
However, there are some reasons to assume that China and India are better equipped than 
any other developing country to master the transition from low-value production and 
services to knowledge-based competitive advantages. It is the combination of market size, 
economic growth, strong FDI inflows (particularly China), strong bargaining power of 
governments, enormous capital accumulation, heavy investment in human resources and 
strong presence in global professional networks (entrepreneurial and academic) that make 
both countries’ catch-up unique.16 The mismatch between still low levels of technological 
development on the one hand, and enormous velocity of the catch-up process on the other 
explains why analyst opinions on the future technological development of both nations 
diverge strongly. In our opinion, it is likely that both countries will manage to build 
clusters of excellence in some fields of science, technology and innovation, both in the 
private and public domain, and that the number of multinational corporations from both 
countries with innovative capacity and brand reputation will increase significantly.   
What does this mean for the competitiveness of Europe? In the last decades, Europe has 
fallen behind in the global economy, with markedly lower rates of economic growth than 
North America and in particular emerging Asian economies. China has successfully 
expanded in traditional industries and virtually crowded out European competitors. India 
is doing the same in software and IT-enabled services but the implications for Europe 
remain unclear.  
These advances in Asia are not a major problem for those European countries that are able 
to shift to higher value added activities. Quite the contrary, these countries will benefit 
from new market opportunities and lower consumer prices. Furthermore, their companies 
will continue to reorganise sourcing strategies in a way that they benefit from low cost 
inputs from Asia, keeping the high-value activities at home. While there will be 
adjustment pains at the micro level, inter- and intra-industry trade would increase to the 
benefit of all trading partners.   
It is a problem, however, for those new EU Member States that have similar patterns of 
specialisation (European Commission 2004, 253 ff.). Hungary for example has a similar 
                                                 
16  See Altenburg / Schmitz / Stamm (2008) for a more detailed argument.  
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trade structure and benefits, like China, from FDI in the manufacture of IT equipment. 
Several new Member States are attracting the same type of software and IT enabled 
services that are being supplied by India. Both the new Member States and the Asian 
Drivers increasingly shift towards human-capital intensive industries, thus moving in the 
same direction. Due to this shift, even the leading European nations in science, technology 
and innovation may be negatively affected if they fail to maintain or extend their 
technological lead. For Europe it is thus important to pay close attention to the catch-up 
process in China and India, define strategies accordingly and invest heavily in its own 
technological advancement.   
3 Shifting to a low carbon economy 
Low carbon technological innovations are needed at an unprecedented speed and depth if 
the target of keeping global warming below the critical level of two degrees Celsius above 
pre-industrial levels is to be achieved. According to Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change projections, GHG emissions need to be reduced quickly: “The key climate change 
models suggest that limiting warming to 2 degrees Celsius will require stopping CO2 
emissions growth in the next decade, and beginning a rapid descent in CO2 emissions 
from current levels by 2050 – all while the projected energy needs of the planet grow by 
two to three fold over this same time period.” (Milford 2006, 3)  
The research challenge is thus formidable: new kinds of renewable and cleaner fossil 
technologies need to be developed; new energy saving technologies are needed across 
almost all economic sectors, including the search for more efficient combustion engines, 
new materials, the use of genomics, nano and biotechnologies; new ‘intelligent’ logistics 
systems which will cut down on transport costs; better traceability and recycling systems 
which will reduce waste of materials. Information and communication technologies (ICT) 
will also play a key role. The development of low carbon technologies is thus a cross-
cutting issue that needs to be built into any science, technology and innovation strategy. 
Developing these innovations is complicated by the existence of a double market failure 
(Goulder 2004). First, there are the usual market failures in developing any innovation, 
e. g. the returns on investment incurred in R&D cannot be fully appropriated by the 
investor; the introduction of new technologies may require simultaneous investments (e. g. 
improved seeds, processing, and end-use technologies in biofuel) that require ex ante 
coordination, and pricing systems may be unable to provide the right signals to the 
investor; and there may be dynamic scale economies, i.e. investments have forward 
linkages that open up completely new production possibilities in the future. These market 
failures are especially likely to occur where new technological paradigms come up. 
Second, the main price for the development of low carbon technologies does not yet exist 
because the environmental and social costs of carbon emissions can almost fully be 
externalised. Hence the main incentive to develop low carbon technologies must be agreed 
politically and markets need to be ‘governed’, either through the establishment of tradable 
emissions rights, or minimum standards, or subsidies, or voluntary agreements.  
Tradable emission rights can be most effective as a signalling device for private investors 
if they are globally accepted. This calls for international consensus-building and global 
regimes that regulate this issue. Likewise, individual governments that use subsidies and 
taxes to support low carbon solutions or suppress polluting technologies can easily fail if 
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other governments do not apply similar measures. Unilateral energy taxes for example 
decrease the competitiveness of downstream industries. Subsidies may even be perverted, 
for example if subsidies for biofuel induce producers to increase production using highly 
energy-consuming methods. As a consequence, new international regimes are required to 
incorporate climate change concerns in the incentive structure of economies (see paper by 
Scholz in this publication). 
The double market failure and the need for international regimes make the low carbon 
transition especially challenging. Little is known about how to master this transition. 
Although an increasing body of literature deals with innovation systems from an 
interdisciplinary perspective, this literature still largely neglects the specificity of low 
carbon technologies, particularly the challenges of the double market failure, and the 
impact of global agreements on incentives. Research on innovation systems traditionally 
focused on national systems (e. g. Lundvall 1992) emphasising that the nation states 
determine the most important systemic variables. This is increasingly questioned by our 
own research on China and India (Altenburg / Schmitz / Stamm 2008) and become even 
more doubtful regarding low carbon innovations. Here, key incentives and regulations are 
determined at global or transnational levels, e. g. emissions trading, the Clean 
Development Mechanism, the Global Environmental Facility etc. The perspective of 
multi-level governance should therefore also be applied to innovation systems research.  
On the other hand, the innovation systems literature does provide useful categories to 
analyse the transition towards a low carbon economy. This transition requires 
simultaneous changes on different fronts. It is not just a matter of inventing and diffusing 
new technologies, but also changing mindsets and habits, building alliances for change, 
and creating new institutions. The innovation system literature has analysed previous 
technological paradigm shifts and developed valuable explanations. For example, it 
emphasises the social and cultural embeddedness of technologies and explores the co-
evolution of technology, institutions, norms and values (e. g. Nelson 1994). It explains 
why innovations occur along certain ‘trajectories’. In many cases, initially several 
competing options exist – e. g. fossil, nuclear and renewable energy technologies. Once 
initial decisions for or against certain options are taken, subsequent investments are 
predetermined. The notions of ‘technological trajectories’ and ‘path dependence’ are use-
ful to explain why societies remain locked into certain technological paradigms. Unruh / 
Carrillo-Hermosilla (2006) have applied this concept to the climate change discussion in 
order to elucidate the multiple technological and institutional barriers that explain the 
current ‘carbon lock-in’. Innovation systems research also reveals that choices of 
technology are not politically ‘neutral’. Regarding the transition towards a low carbon 
economy, for example, economic and political battles take place within Europe and within 
China and India between stakeholders interested in new trajectories and others who benefit 
from the status quo. Integrating the research on innovation systems and climate change is 
therefore one of the most promising perspectives of our research agenda.   
4 How does the low carbon imperative affect Europe’s competitive position 
vis-à-vis the Asian Drivers? Some hypotheses   
While there is an obvious need to speed up low carbon innovations for climate change 
reasons, the search process also has implications for the competitiveness of nations and 
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therefore requires a careful balancing of national and global public interests. The low 
carbon paradigm influences Europe’s competitive position vis-à-vis the Asian Drivers as 
well as the latter’s prospects for catching up in a number of ways. Both Europe and the 
Asian Drivers have multiple, but different, incentives to develop low carbon technologies. 
These will result in different technological trajectories.  
The European Union is currently the major driving force in favour of climate change 
action, although performance in this regard varies greatly from country to country. In 
some European countries, constituencies are well aware of the hazards related to climate 
change and put pressure on their governments and private corporations – probably more so 
than in any other regions of the world. Sweden, Germany, Iceland, Hungary, the United 
Kingdom and Switzerland rank particularly high on Germanwatch’s Climate Change 
Performance Index (Germanwatch 2007). European industries are global leaders in many 
climate-related technologies, such as renewable energy technologies and low-emission 
power plants. Hence they are likely to benefit from an early mover advantage. As Porter 
(1990) emphasises, challenging home markets – in terms of demanding consumers and 
strict regulatory standards – are an important determinant of competitive advantage. This 
is likely to further strengthen European countries as low carbon technology providers – 
not necessarily in comparison with other OECD countries, but definitely compared to the 
Asian Drivers. Also, environmental industries often require collaborative solutions, and 
the existence of networks of complementary industries and service providers is therefore 
likely to favour Europe where certain well established technology clusters exist (e. g. for 
wind power plants in Denmark). The ability to provide integrated system solutions across 
different technology fields is particularly important for low carbon technologies. It should 
be noted, though, that some (mostly South and East) European countries are very poor 
climate change performers. In most cases, these are also countries with lower 
technological capabilities. These countries are unlikely to become drivers – and 
beneficiaries in terms of competitiveness – of the low carbon technology shift. 
Both Asian Drivers on the other hand are highly dependent on imported fossil fuels. 
Shortages of fossil fuel supply are seen as one of the main risks for future economic 
growth. Both countries – and particularly China – are therefore very actively pursuing 
integrated strategies to secure access to international energy resources, but also to develop 
renewable energies and to adopt more stringent climate change regulations at home. 
Besides the energy security issue, China and India are among the nations that will be most 
negatively affected by climate change (WBGU 2008). Both countries have therefore set 
ambitious targets, in particular for energy efficiency and the development and diffusion of 
renewable energy that are likely to lead to GHG emission reduction. To what extent these 
targets can be achieved depends on the capabilities of both countries’ environmental 
administrations. Lack of implementation capacity and lack of an efficient and independent 
judiciary may hamper the innovation drive. Finally, the lack of free markets, and a 
financial sector where banks are pushed to lend according to political criteria (European 
Commission 2004, 237), may hold back creative search processes particularly in China.  
On the positive side, paradigm changes always create opportunities for leapfrogging. 
Previous success stories of technological latecomer development often occurred when 
demand conditions changed. India’s software boom for example took off in the mid-1980s 
when the so-called Unix-workstation-standard made programming of software 
independent from the hardware platform. This was the start of large-scale relocation of 
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programming contracts (Dossani 2005). Likewise, coincidental opportunities may emerge 
in the development of low carbon technologies. Additionally both Asian Drivers are 
experiencing phases of extraordinary growth, and most projections see this trend 
persisting (e. g. Deutsche Bank Research 2005). Strong investment growth implies a rapid 
build-up of new facilities and thus accelerates technology diffusion, compared to Europe, 
where old facilities are not yet written off. Also, growing economies may more easily 
incorporate environmental reforms because all stakeholders may be better off if growth 
dividends are available, and veto players can be compensated (Jäger 2006, 7 f.). And 
finally, both countries are experienced in organising mission-oriented research, e. g. in the 
space and nuclear technology (see e. g. Baskaran 2005 for India). Although such 
politically supported missions may result in misallocation of funds, they may also help to 
raise a critical mass of investments in specific low carbon technologies and help to 
overcome coordination failures of the market.  
In summary, Europe and the Asian Drivers undertake – and will probably be forced to 
speed up – explicit measures to promote low carbon technology development. Different 
demand conditions, different innovative capabilities, and different political interests and 
governance structures however are likely to result in dissimilar speeds and patterns of low 
carbon technology development. It is difficult to anticipate who will gain and who will 
lose (in competitiveness terms) from the shift to low carbon technologies.   
5 How do the Asian Drivers deal with their ’twin challenge’? The need for 
collaborative research 
How China and India simultaneously manage their catch-up process and the transition 
towards a low carbon economy is of utmost importance for Europe. It is important to 
achieve global climate targets, and it affects existing and future competitive advantages of 
Europe and the emerging Asian economies. Understanding this twin challenge and 
anticipating even the broad directions of technological change, however, is not easy and 
requires substantial in-depth research. First, because it is difficult to predict how rapidly 
climate will actually change, and with what effects; how rapidly the public – voters, 
media, consumers – will react and put pressure on policymakers and private companies to 
take serious actions; and what technological paradigms will emerge. Technological 
developments are path-dependent, and unpredictable breakthroughs in specific 
technologies – fusion power?; solar power?; fuel cells? – will trigger specific follow-up 
innovations.  
Second, there is considerable risk that European researchers misinterpret developments in 
China and India if they do not have a thorough understanding of the peculiarities of these 
countries. Three peculiarities stand out (see Humphrey’s and Messner’s paper in this 
publication): 
1. China and India are non-Western countries with different institutional structures and 
different values. This makes it more difficult for outsiders to understand internal 
processes and predict the effectiveness of Chinese and Indian institutions. With regard 
to industrial and innovation policy in particular, China and India strongly deviate from 
Western standard policy prescriptions – and nevertheless have achieved very high 
economic growth and a steeper technological learning curve than almost any other 
developing country. Their growth trajectories not only reflect incorporation of 
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additional workers and capital but also substantial total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth. It is puzzling that China and India are among the fastest growing economies of 
the world while both countries rank very low on the Index of Economic Freedom and 
the Ease of Doing Business Indicator (Altenburg / von Drachenfels 2007). China in 
particular supports ‘national champions’; develops national standards as trade barriers; 
uses public procurement for industrial policy goals; offers foreign investors greater tax 
benefits, import/export rights, and access to the domestic market when they introduce 
new technologies or build up R&D facilities; largely tolerates product piracy; 
establishes upper limits for foreign equity shares that protect domestic companies from 
takeovers by international corporations, etc. The European Commission (2004, 239) 
warns that ‘the lack of a workable competitive system combined with a heavy-handed 
industrial policy and widespread corruption bode ill for the creation of industrial 
structures that are to guide China’s economic prospects in the coming decades.’ 
Although India’s government does not interfere at the same level, it also regulates 
many industries and implements mission-oriented policies in a centrally planned, top-
down manner. It is not easy to establish to what extent these ‘anti-Western’ policies 
have been instrumental for success – or whether growth and technological catch up 
would have been even faster without them - the counterfactual is not available. In any 
case, the Asian Drivers apply non-Western sets of policies, and their economies thrive.   
2. China and India are poor countries, with per capita incomes of 820 US$ (India) and 
2010 US$ (China), compared to 36,620 US$ in Germany.17 This has a bearing on their 
policy priorities and their ability to finance and implement policies. Poverty reduction 
and political stability rank high on the agenda of China’s and India’s governments, 
whereas climate change as such is not among the main concerns of political 
constituencies. Governments therefore have good reasons to focus on the development 
of environmental technologies that bring about immediate economic benefits (such as 
increased energy efficiency), and they may be more tolerant with regard to 
environmental spillovers with long-term effects. In some cases, the design of low 
carbon policies reflects concerns about poverty. India’s biofuel policy for example 
establishes that only non-edible crops be processed and no arable land be dedicated to 
biodiesel production. Low incomes also imply that it is politically not feasible to 
impose high environmental taxes on fossil fuels or to subsidise biofuels strongly. 
Likewise, poor countries have less scope for financing innovations, and they have a 
stronger inclination towards applied rather than basic research. Related to poverty and 
underdevelopment is the fact that the tissue of private sector firms is less diversified 
and competitive. Only few companies perform systematic R&D, and few are ready to 
integrate in global value chains. As a consequence, FDI accounted for 58 per cent of 
all Chinese exports in 2005 (Freeman 2007, 18), and even though these exports are 
increasingly knowledge-intensive it can be assumed that most knowledge-intensive 
inputs come from abroad or from other multinational corporation (MNC) affiliates in 
China. In sum, technological priorities and trajectories are quite different from those in 
Europe and other old industrialised countries. 
3. Both are large and heterogeneous countries. One of the most obvious effects is that 
“on any measure, absolute numbers and per capita figures tell two different stories” 
(OECD 2007, 21). In both countries, research capabilities are strongly concentrated in 
                                                 
17  World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 14 Sept. 2007. 
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distinct cities or regions, and involve relatively small populations. Great numbers of 
aspirants from the rest of the country seek to gain access to the modern and well-paid 
jobs, thereby guaranteeing an influx of ‘hungry’ talented people that keeps skilled 
wage levels low by international standards. Furthermore, market size translates into 
bargaining power vis-à-vis foreign investors. Especially China trades market access 
for technology. And finally, market size combined with high growth allows both 
countries to accumulate capital to finance large-scale programmes that are far beyond 
the reach of other developing countries.  
These peculiarities imply that China and India will embark on very different technological 
trajectories and underline the need for in-depth collaborative research. In a recent paper on 
lessons learned from managing R&D projects in foreign firms in China, the authors – all 
R&D practitioners – argue that “to realize China’s potential and opportunities, it is 
crucial to be a part of it, grow with it, give back to receive, and most importantly be there 
when it happens. China is changing rapidly. What is supposed to be a ‘Chinese standard’ 
is actually a ‘moving target’” (von Zedtwitz et al. 2007, 26). 
6 Challenges for European policy 
The twin challenge creates new demands on European technology and innovation policy. 
The following five policy challenges seem to be key. Our collaborative and policy-
oriented research programme aims to further specify the policy challenges:  
1. Europe needs to step up its effort in science, technology and innovation in order to 
maintain its competitive edge and avoid price competition in similar technologies. In 
particular, the EU must make a stronger effort to achieve the ‘Barcelona target’ of 
3 per cent spending on R&D. This holds for the more advanced innovators as much as 
for those new Member States that have similar trade structures. 
2. European research policy should focus more strongly on sustainability and climate 
change issues. Research funding, university curricula and R&D incentives for the 
private sector should stimulate low carbon issues. As Milford (2006, 4 f.) observes, 
policy circles are currently focusing on incentives for reducing energy demand; 
deploying traditional renewable energies; and imposing carbon caps in the OECD. The 
missing element, he argues, is a massive climate technology innovation programme.  
3. Europe needs to develop a coherent strategy towards China and India (as well as other 
emerging powers, e. g. Brazil). As newcomers, both countries have until recently been 
heavily underestimated by European policymakers. Strategy building in the first place 
requires more thorough knowledge about the Asian Drivers, e. g. their markets, the 
capabilities of their enterprises, and their policies. Currently there is a strong deficit 
with regard to evidence-based policy analysis. Second, it requires consensus building 
among EU Member States. Interests towards China and India diverge quite strongly. 
Some countries have a defensive position (e. g. reflected in disputes over textile and 
footwear imports) whereas others have strong interests to gain from liberalised trade 
and mainly press for better market access, lifting restrictions on FDI and better 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. Even among the most innovative European 
countries, approaches towards climate, energy and industrial policy diverge 
significantly, e. g. on the issue of nuclear energy (e. g. France vs. Germany) and state 
involvement in industrial policy (e. g. France vs. Britain). Third, priorities and 
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strategic actions need to be defined. Europe, and each of its Member States, need to 
identify where gains from cooperation can be expected, both with regard to public 
goods and in pursuit of national goals, such as better access to China’s and India’s 
growing markets and talent pools. This process is fraught with trade-offs. How can 
Europe for example share environmental technologies for the sake of climate 
protection, and how can it tap into the growing talent pools, without risking a leakage 
of its core competences? What are the trade-offs between development assistance and 
competition? Clear guidelines need to be developed to deal with these trade-offs in a 
coherent way.  
4. Collaboration with China and India should be enhanced in many fields, and using 
multiple instruments. Our focus here is on collaborative research. As Huang and Soete 
rightly point out, Europe’s Lisbon Agenda is too inward-looking. The authors argue 
against European research ‘cocooning’ (Huang / Soete 2007, 12) and state that “what 
is today probably least needed, yet most funded, is intra-European, or more broadly 
‘North-North’ shared research; by contrast what is most needed … is North-South 
shared research and knowledge diffusion.” (ibid., 29). For the reason pointed out 
earlier, the peculiarities of China and India as non-Western developing countries with 
huge global impacts and sizeable talent pools are especially rewarding for the 
internationalisation of research networking. In recent years, increasing attention is 
being given to China and India as objects of research, but not by systematically 
incorporating Asian researchers. It is probably not sufficient to provide a few more 
scholarships for Chinese and Indian students and researchers to visit European 
research institutions, and vice versa. What is needed are a) competences on the part of 
European researchers to understand technological trajectories and decision-making 
processes of poor non-Western countries; and b) European-Asian scientific 
communities that jointly develop and implement (in particular policy-oriented) 
research programmes. Research funds need to be redirected and role models (good 
practices) created on how to make such scientific communities work. 
5. Policy dialogue should be enhanced with regard to issues related to climate change and 
technological innovation. This policy dialogue should not only be normative but also 
research-based. Issues for dialogue include mechanisms for burden sharing with regard 
to public goods as well as topics related to economic governance and collaboration. 
Europe and the Asian Drivers need to search for win-win constellations in economic 
and technological collaboration. This requires open dialogue on critical subjects that 
currently hamper closer relationships, particularly problems of free and fair reciprocal 
market access, protection of intellectual property rights and technology transfer. 
7 Key questions for future research 
This final section extracts research questions that will shape future DIE/IDS studies on the 
issue of China’s and India’s technological catch-up, particularly low carbon, strategies, 
and their implications for Europe. Our research builds on both institutions’ tradition of 
doing comparative research on industrial and innovation policy in developing countries, 
and draws on well-established research and policy networks within Europe and with 
Chinese and Indian partners. It links up with ongoing policy research, dialogue and 
training activities and aims to complement them with a collaborative post-doc programme.  
Seven broad research areas have been identified that are a) not yet well researched and b) 
particularly relevant for European policy. 
Poor and powerful – the rise of China and India and the implications for Europe 
German Development Institute 37
1. Competition or complementarity between innovation in Asia and Europe? In 
which fields will China and/or India master the transition from low value-added 
manufacturing and/or services to knowledge-driven economies that seriously 
challenge Europe’s competitive edge? And if so, how rapidly? What division of labour 
will emerge between the EU and China, or EU and India? To what extent are 
technological achievements a mere reflection of increased offshoring of production 
sites by foreign firms, and to what degree does technological learning take place in 
foreign dominated value chains? Will China and India be able to endogenise the 
knowledge involved in such operations? How innovative are the foreign R&D centres? 
Will the strategic innovation activities remain in Europe?   
2. What are the key mechanisms for technological catch-up in China and India? Are 
there common patterns in the evolution of innovation capabilities? Do we witness new 
‘models’ of technological catch-up that are based on incremental upgrading of 
assembly activities, plus return migration of emigrants with a long entrepreneurial and 
academic exposure in the West, plus the acquisition of technology-owning companies, 
plus negotiated technology transfer – rather than synergic bottom-up developments of 
national clusters, as common wisdom in innovation science suggests? How important 
are technology acquisitions of high tech companies by Asian Driver firms? What role 
does R&D outsourcing play? How big is the risk of leakage of core competencies, and 
do cost advantages outweigh these risks? What is the role of return migration of 
change agents with knowledge about markets and networks? And how important are 
‘traditional innovation system factors’, such as university linkages and local collective 
action? How important is market size? Does sheer size enable the Asian Drivers to 
exploit economies of scale and to negotiate better technology transfer conditions than 
other countries?  
3. Does the shift to a low carbon economy strengthen Europe’s competitive 
advantage? What direct and indirect incentives do Chinese and Indian governments 
set to develop and diffuse low carbon technologies? Are there ambitious 
targets/realistic expectations for major technological advancements in this regard? To 
what extent do these incentives contribute to the development of new competitive 
advantages? How does the expected shift towards ‘low carbon innovation policies’ 
affect Europe’s competitive position vis-à-vis the Asian Drivers? Does Europe benefit 
from early mover advantages and more demanding markets, or does the paradigm 
change benefit the newcomers? 
4. How effective are China’s and India’s industrial and innovation policies 
compared to European practice? Accelerating low carbon technology innovations 
requires government interventions, e. g. for the development of a carbon market, 
compulsory blending of fuels, taxing energy consumption etc. How compatible is this 
with existing governance styles in China and India, as compared to Europe? What are 
the advantages and disadvantages of more market-based vs more government-led 
systems in dealing with the dual market failure of low carbon technology 
development? China and India are countries where markets are seriously distorted by 
political bureaucrats in the pursuit of industrialisation and technological development 
goals. Does the strategic industrial policy that is pursued mainly by China (picking 
winners, trading market access for technologies, technological targeting etc.) 
accelerate or hamper technological catch-up and the low carbon transition?  
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5. How likely is a Europe-Asian consensus with regard to global regulations? How 
do China’s and India’s position evolve with regard to global regulations that affect 
their competitiveness strategies, in particular in the negotiation of global trade and 
investment regimes and regarding intellectual property rights? What global regulations 
exist, or are being discussed, that create incentives for low carbon technology 
innovations, and what is China’s and India’s position in this respect? Does China’s 
proposal for a global technology fund for renewable energies provide a viable option?   
6. What is the potential for technology cooperation between Europe and the Asian 
drivers? Where do complementarities exist, particularly in low carbon technologies? 
Where do European and Asian technology institutions have specific strengths? How 
can exchange programmes be intensified, and which research topics should have 
priority? Which innovative forms of collaborative research are most promising? How 
can Europe find an appropriate balance between technology diffusion in the pursuit of 
global public goods and the protection of European intellectual property rights? As 
research becomes more and more internationalised, how can Europe benefit from 
increased R&D spending elsewhere, and how big is the risk that the benefits of 
European R&D investments will be appropriated by other countries? What is the role 
of private sector R&D in Europe-Asian technology collaboration?   
7. How can low carbon alliances be strengthened across the European-Asian and 
the public-private divides? How can collaboration among ‘low carbon reformers’ be 
fostered? Who are the most innovative partners in China, India and Europe, and how 
can collaborative research strengthen their role? What are the most appropriate 
incentives to encourage European corporations, especially those already performing 
R&D in China or India, to engage even more in collaborative programmes for low 
carbon technologies?   
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IV Climate Change: China and India as contributors to problems and 
solutions 
Imme Scholz 
1 Introduction 
The main objective of our research on climate change within the context of the evolving 
relationship between the European Union (EU), China and India is threefold. First, we 
want to understand the relevance of the Asian Drivers for the further development of the 
international climate regime, and second, we want to elaborate categories which help to 
determine more precisely both the challenges and the opportunities implied by this 
relevance for the EU as a pioneer in this global governance arena. Third, in connection 
with the research package on innovation capacity, we want to explore the opportunities for 
learning which exist for several actors and their networks on both sides – in the EU, in 
China and India, between these two policy fields (climate change and innovation) and 
between these two regions, Europe and Asia. 
The following paper presents some thoughts about what a work programme dealing with 
these three issues could look like. It is intended to be a starting point for further debate.  
In the emerging global climate regime, the relevance of the Asian Drivers as large and 
growing emitters (see next section for data) was never neglected as much as it was in other 
fields of global collective action. In fact, their emissions were constantly used by the US 
as an argument for blocking progress in negotiations, by linking the acceptance of own 
commitments to reduction targets to the request that China and India should commit 
themselves as well (Davenport 2006). But despite their objective relevance, industrialised 
countries have not been able to develop constructive ways for involving China and India 
in mitigation policies and measures on a basis that could be considered as sustainable and 
fair.  
The EU could play an innovative role in this regard, as it has already played a critical role 
in acting as the fulcrum of global climate change negotiations (Vogler / Stephan 2007). 
This has been clear in the process of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, where the EU 
turned from an opponent of its flexible mechanisms to an active strategist for securing its 
ratification. And it was demonstrated again in the climate negotiations in Bali where the 
EU has played a pivotal role in bringing about the final declaration, and thus in ensuring a 
roadmap for the further development of the climate regime after 2012. 
This strong role of the EU in international climate policy has been facilitated on the one 
hand by the absence of the US in this policy field, but on the other hand also by the 
progress made with regard to instruments and policy coordination and coherence, which 
showed that the EU was able to move beyond rhetoric. The European Emission Trading 
System is an innovative instrument for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and an 
important building stone of the emerging international carbon market. The EU’s climate 
and energy policy fixed Europe’s emission reduction target at 20 per cent until 2020 
(compared with 1990) and linked it with further objectives in the areas of energy 
efficiency and renewable energy sources. These aims are not as ambitious as they could 
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be, but they are a first important step towards linking economic growth, energy policy, 
technological innovation and greenhouse gas emissions on regional and national level 
(Dröge 2007). At the same time, they gave an important impetus to global negotiations. 
In Bali, industrialised countries committed to “measurable, reportable and verifiable 
nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission 
limitation and reduction objectives”, while developing countries committed to “nationally 
appropriated mitigation actions … in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner” 
(Bali Action Plan, articles 1 (b) (i) and (ii); for a political analysis of these commitments 
see Müller 2008). During negotiations, the Europeans backed the developing countries in 
the final session against the US demand for binding commitments to emission reductions 
by developing countries. Negotiations were difficult because industrialised countries could 
not reach a clear quantitative agreement on the emissions reductions they should achieve 
in the next commitment period. But they agreed to give more support for technology 
transfer to developing countries, in order to help them in controlling their GHG emissions. 
In the next two years, all efforts will be concentrating on achieving an accord at the end of 
2009, in order to be able to sign a new protocol in 2012 which will secure the framework 
conditions for global emissions trading and establish a basis for a more comprehensive 
integration of developing countries. In these two years, dialogue and cooperation with 
China and India will be crucial for overcoming the obstacles on the way to 2009 and 
beyond – the relationship with these two countries will be as important as negotiations 
within the EU and with the US. Dialogue and cooperation cannot be limited to climate 
change; they have to include other issues debated on other global governance arenas, 
namely world trade and intellectual property rights. 
But even when the survival and further development of the international climate regime is 
secured, the relationship with China and India will remain important. In these two 
countries, coping with climate change – regarding both emissions reduction and adaptation 
to the inevitable impacts of climate change – will be a fundamental cross-cutting political 
issue. If the challenges are met, this process will bring about institutional, organisational 
and technological reforms and innovations that provide a common learning ground for all 
countries. 
In order to devise an effective cooperation strategy with China and India, the EU needs to 
better understand how the sources of greenhouse gas emissions, their linkages to economic 
structures, as well as political and institutional capacity constraints in these countries 
determine their internal climate-related policies. The EU itself has had problems in 
translating goals and intentions into achievements: seven of the 15 EU members 
committed to the Kyoto Protocol are unlikely to reach their targets (CEC 2007).  
In order to tap the potential for cooperation between the EU and the Asian Drivers, new 
partnerships are necessary in order to secure innovation in both global governance regimes 
and in institutions on a national and regional level relevant for mitigating climate change. 
These partnerships could be constructed in specific areas, such as research and 
development, and build on existing thematic policy dialogues, e. g. the Indo-European 
Energy Dialogue or the Chinese Commission on International Environment and 
Development, where European participants could coordinate their activities more actively, 
including their national governments and the European Commission. These partnerships 
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or dialogues could be used for informal debates on new policy proposals for the 
advancement of the climate regime, including the introduction of innovative national or 
regional measures (in the sense of the polyarchic regime mentioned below). Also, 
dialogues could be instrumental in identifying options for positive linkages between other 
multilateral fora and climate change and for the promotion of low carbon technologies. 
In the following, we will first describe the problem of climate change, then refer to China 
and India as relevant actors in this problem and policy field, focus on the main 
characteristics of China, and finally outline the research packages and questions we want 
to focus on. 
2 The problem 
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
issued in 2007 has made clear that time is running out if the goal of limiting global 
warming to an average of 2°C is to be achieved. Total emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) should peak by 2015 and be reduced by 50 per cent until 2050 (baseline year 
1990). As the industrialised countries are historically responsible for the bulk of 
greenhouse gases emitted, they will have to reduce their emissions by 60 to 80 per cent 
until 2050. Projections suggest, however, that in the absence of policy actions, GHG 
emissions will increase by 50 per cent by 2025 compared to present levels. Emissions in 
developing countries grow fastest, and after 2020, they will cause more GHG emissions 
than industrialised countries (Baumert / Herzog / Pershing 2005). This means that 
measures are needed in order to first decrease the pace of emissions growth in developing 
countries and second to reduce them, at least by 2050. 
There are large differences both within the group of industrialised as well as developing 
countries regarding absolute volumes of emissions and per capita emissions. Absolute 
volumes are related to the size of the economy and the population: the US, China, the EU-
25, India and Russia are the five largest emitters. Per capita emissions are generally higher 
in wealthier countries, but other factors are also important: four of the six top emitters in 
this category are Arab oil states, the other two are Australia (rank 4) and the US (rank 6). 
The EU-25 ranks 37, China 99 and India 140 (Baumert / Herzog / Pershing 2005). 
Differences in per capita emissions indicate that there must be considerable differences in 
emissions intensity – the level of CO2 emissions per unit of economic output – between 
countries. Emissions intensity is related to the specific economic structure of a country, its 
energy efficiency and its fuel mix, but it is neither connected to the size of a country’s 
economy nor its population. These are the variables that have to be influenced if future 
emissions are to be limited; possible means are technological and organisational 
innovations, laws and economic incentives, and new institutional arrangements that foster 
social learning towards a low carbon economy. 
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Table 1: Greenhouse gas emissions from the US, the EU, China and India 
 US EU-25 China India 
GHG emissions 
(MtCO2 equivalent, 
2000) 
6,928 4,725 4,938 1,884 
Per capita emissions 
(tons CO2 eq.) 
24.5 10.5 3.9 1.9 
Income per capita 
(2002 $PPP) 
34,557 22,917 4,379 2,572 
Emissions intensity 
(tons CO2 eq. / $mil. 
GDP-PPP) 
720 449 1,023 768 
% change in 
emissions intensity 
1990-2002 
-17 -23 -51 -9 
Source: Baumert / Herzog / Pershing (2005) 
The risks and future negative social and economic impacts associated with global warming 
are a strong motivating factor for reducing the emissions intensity of economic 
development. Another factor is that reserves of fossil fuels are known to be finite. 
Securing energy supply in a growing economy is therefore inevitably linked with the 
promotion of renewable energy technologies. 
In this research package, we will not deal with the problems associated with the 
development and diffusion of innovations geared towards a low carbon economy, but with 
the institutional arrangements conducive to it. In the following we will quickly explore 
some broad questions related to the global governance of climate change and then proceed 
with explaining the special importance of China and India for mitigating climate change. 
We will then briefly elaborate on possible consequences for European climate policy and 
finally conclude with some specific research questions that could be derived from the 
topics analysed in this paper. 
3 The global governance of climate change and the need for a multilevel 
perspective 
The international regime dealing with climate change is the United Nations Framework 
Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) that was signed in 1992. The Convention 
establishes a basis for governments and non-governmental actors interested in joint 
activities for the reduction of global warming and for coping with the impacts of 
temperature increases. The Framework Convention introduced some definitions and 
principles which structure the debate on what should be done by whom and how the costs 
should be shared. Although these definitions and principles were agreed by consensus, 
their practical meaning remains highly controversial. The call for ‘the widest possible 
cooperation … and … participation in an effective and appropriate international response’ 
is linked with the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities’, which alludes to climate being a global common whose overuse is linked 
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with historical disparities in development between North and South. Therefore, it is the 
industrialised nations who should take immediate action, while developing countries are 
granted a ‘right to development’ because growth is inevitably linked with an increase in 
energy consumption. The Convention also affirms the principle of national sovereignty 
while recalling the responsibility of avoiding damage at the transnational level. 
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was added and signed, albeit not by all parties to the 
Convention (notably the US). The Kyoto Protocol establishes binding targets for emission 
reductions by industrialised countries (baseline year 1990) within a specific timeframe. It 
also introduced flexible mechanisms which allow industrialised countries to invest in 
emission reductions in developing countries (CDM – Clean Development Mechanism) 
and in economies in transition (JI – Joint Implementation), and deduct the reductions 
achieved from their national targets. The EU committed to a global reduction target which 
was redistributed in a differentiated manner within the member states, based on socio-
economic criteria. 
The Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. At the last meeting of the UNFCCC parties in Bali in 
December 2007, a roadmap for the further development of the climate regime was agreed. 
Its main elements are further emission reductions by industrialised countries, real 
advances in technology transfer in order to support emission reductions in developing 
countries, a financial regime for adaptation to the impacts of climate change and 
incentives for reducing emissions generated by tropical deforestation. Climate negotiations 
have to produce the rough structure of a new treaty until 2009, so that it may become 
effective in 2012. 
For a long time, climate change has been framed as an environmental problem, and in 
most countries the Convention became the responsibility of environmental ministries. This 
framing is not surprising as the climate is one of the fundamental regulatory mechanisms 
of the ecological earth system. The causal mechanisms behind climate change, however, 
are not governed by environmental ministries: greenhouse gas emissions are mostly 
related to energy use (e. g. electricity and heat, transportation and industry) as well as to 
land use change, agriculture and waste. Reducing GHG emissions, therefore, is directly 
linked with economic interests, and any policy measure proposed at the level of the 
Convention interfered with the core responsibility of other ministries: energy, economy, 
transport, trade, agriculture and forestry. The cross-cutting nature of climate change, and 
thus of the strategies needed to limit it, only became policy-relevant when the Kyoto 
Protocol became operational in 2005, after its ratification by Russia. Policies and 
instruments which had been prepared for implementing the Kyoto Protocol – such as the 
European Emission Trading System – were introduced, and their far-reaching character 
became clear. In many countries, this led to a reframing of the climate change problem as 
related mainly to energy policy, and thus to economic and technological decisions. 
The cross-sectoral nature of climate change means that it requires a high degree of policy 
coordination on a domestic level, and that it reaches out to other arenas of global 
governance. This requires cross-sectoral clarifications with other ongoing global 
negotiation processes, e. g. the Doha Round. The provisions of the World Trade 
Organization and the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) have 
a strong influence on climate policy instruments: the WTO for example prohibits the 
introduction of import taxes based on the carbon-intensity of a product because carbon-
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intensity is a characteristic of production processes, not of the product. The TRIPS 
Agreement protects the property rights of innovation developers, which – while creating 
strong economic incentives for R&D – raises obstacles for the diffusion of low-carbon 
technologies in poor economies unable to afford the costs of technology acquisition. At 
the same time, the lack of international regimes in certain policy areas also creates 
problems, especially regarding energy and migration. 
Climate change is not only cross-cutting in terms of sectors, but also in terms of 
geographical scales. Emissions are caused on the local level, their reduction is regulated 
on sub-national (e. g. in the case of some US states), national and regional level (in the 
case of the EU), and their effect is aggregated on the global level. The impacts of global 
warming occur at the local level, and there is no direct relation between locations with 
high emissions and with strong negative impacts: the impacts of climate change are 
distributed independently from the origin of emissions. The multi-scalar nature of climate 
change also requires policy coordination on all levels: between local communities, from 
the local to the sub-national and national level, on regional as well as the global level. 
Policy coordination between sectors and scales is thus needed to a high degree if climate 
change policies are to be effective and efficient. 
4 Theoretical perspectives and methodological consequences 
Useful heuristic concepts and theoretical perspectives for the analysis of the institutional 
arrangements of climate policy can be taken from regime theory and from earth system 
analysis. 
Political science-based research on the climate regime frames it mainly within the research 
on international environmental regimes. This research deals with regime formation, its 
attributes, consequences, and dynamics (Young 2002), and it has been strongly influenced 
by the dominance of neorealism and neoliberalism in the field of international relations. 
Actors’ behaviour was analysed with the help of the concepts of power, interests and 
knowledge; states or governments were considered to be the most relevant actors and were 
treated as unitary actors making specific choices, which were determined either by power 
or coercion or by incentives and utilitarian calculations.  
Recent results from an evaluation of 23 international environmental regimes and the 
compliance of 13 countries (including the US, Germany, China, and India), however, 
indicate that besides power, interests and knowledge, norms and path dependencies should 
be given much more attention for understanding how international regimes influence 
national policymaking (Breitmeier / Young / Zürn 2007). The reasons given can be 
applied very well to the climate regime: 
“Our findings suggest that it is not helpful to assume that well-informed actors 
with pre-determined interests or preferences enter into agreements about 
environmental problems that can be understood as issue-specific social 
contracts. In fact, many regimes deal with issues that are poorly understood; 
individual members often lack both the factual information and the theoretical 
understanding that would be needed to forecast the probable impacts of the 
operation of regimes on their interests.(… Actors make the choices they do 
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either because they represent the best alternatives … or because they 
constitute normatively preferred alternatives. … To be more specific … Actors 
often choose options that conform to the precepts of a knowledge system or a 
discourse that has come to dominate thinking about a particular issue … 
There are also clear indications that perceptions of legitimacy matter. 
Whether an issue arises at the local level or the global level, stakeholders who 
believe that the rules of the game have arisen from a process that is fair or 
equitable are more likely to abide by them on a day-to-day basis than 
stakeholders who feel no sense of ownership of the process …. Beyond this, 
habits or standard operating procedures play a significant role. The secret of 
success in most social practices arises from the fact that following the rules 
becomes for most participants a matter of second nature.” (Breitmeier / 
Young / Zürn 2007, 55–6). 
The analysis of normative discourses and habits or operational procedures for 
understanding policy processes is especially interesting when looking at a policy field 
such as climate change. This policy field seems to be strongly dominated by controversies 
due to diverging interests and power imbalances. How to explain then the perseverance of 
negotiations? The norms, procedures, discourses and mental pictures of the climate regime 
itself may help to foster learning processes despite ongoing controversies, and induce 
policy coordination and decision-making processes on a domestic level conducive to the 
regime’s objectives (see Yu 2004 for the Chinese case). 
Earth system analysis provides a second avenue of thought that leads to similar 
recommendations. The point of departure here is global environmental change as a process 
that affects the fundamental mechanics of the global ecosystem as a whole. This problem 
definition requires a holistic approach in institutional design (of solutions) and analysis (of 
the causes). In terms of analysis, this means that it is not enough to analyse the dynamics 
of international environmental regimes at the global level or the interaction of national 
governments or aggregated interests which influence regime formation and implement-
tation.  
“On the contrary, a holistic view requires us to look at the full scale of 
institutions because all levels contribute to the holistic whole. This means … 
that … the structures beneath the international layer must be rediscovered, i.e. 
regional integration, the state, and the self-regulatory potential of societies 
and transnational societal actors and networks.” (Winter 2007, 2). 
A holistic, multilevel perspective on the global governance of climate change does not 
necessarily include the vision of a global well-ordered unity. Instead, it is possible to think 
of: 
“… a polyarchy of institutions located at several organisational levels, divided 
into many issue-related sections and dispersed over various geographical zones. 
This polyarchy would be self-organisational in order to reflect the common 
concern of preserving an inhabitable earth system …”(Winter 2007, 2). 
This polyarchic thinking may be well suited to a globalised, but still quite diverse world of 
different nation-states, with their own pluralistic political discourses, heterogeneous values 
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and norms, differing socio-economic interests, and their multiplicity of social and 
economic actors, their networks and path dependencies. 
One methodological consequence from these two strands of thought is that in-depth 
studies of domestic policy processes connected with regime formation, implementation 
and development are highly relevant. In the case of the climate regime, this approach is 
even more relevant since China and India are the main new global players in this arena, 
and their domestic policy processes are poorly understood in the West. 
Which economic and political actors and interests interfere in the formation of climate 
policy positions? How do they articulate their interests? Which norms and standards 
structure the procedures for interest articulation and aggregation? What is the importance 
of sub-regional differences, and do they have an influence on policy formation? How has 
the climate policy discourse in these countries been structured, by whom, and has it 
changed since 1992? Which actors are integrated in transnational networks related to 
climate change, and what is the influence of these networks on social/institutional learning 
and knowledge diffusion? 
These are questions of high importance for understanding how the interrelated facts of 
climate change, economic growth and GHG emissions are interpreted in the domestic 
context and transformed into propositions for international negotiations. In the next 
section, we will focus on climate-related policies in China and India. 
5 Understanding climate-related policies in China and India 
China and India are among the top five emitters of greenhouse gases: China comes 
second, and India comes last in this group. In terms of population, both countries also 
belong to the top five. Both countries also belong to the top five countries regarding 
economic size: when measuring their gross domestic product in purchasing power parities, 
China comes second with 10 per cent of the world economy, and India comes fifth with 4 
per cent (World Bank 2007). 
These figures all relate to absolute size. They led to the strong feeling before the UNFCCC 
conference in Bali in December 2007 that China and India both had no reasonable 
argument for refusing binding reduction targets for their future emissions. 
However, these figures divert attention from one fundamental difference between China, 
India and the other countries belonging to the top five emitters, and that is poverty, 
reflected in extremely low emission data if calculated on a per capita basis. The average 
emissions per capita of the developed world are 14.1 tons CO2 eq., while the average for 
the developing world is 3.3 (world average: 5.6). China has a per capita emission of 3.9 
tons, which is slightly more than the average of the developing world, but definitely below 
world average. India’s per capita emission is even lower: only 1.9 tons, which locates it 
even below the average of the developing world (Baumert / Herzog / Pershing 2005, 22). 
Clearly, size and poverty, two of the four categories mentioned in the paper by John 
Humphrey and Dirk Messner that make China and India special global players, are 
relevant for understanding their role and behaviour in global climate negotiations. 
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Relevance can also be attached to the other two categories – location in Asia and non-
Western traditions.  
Their geographical location is of political importance regarding climate change as well: 
both countries rely on the Himalayas for a substantial part of their water supply; they share 
borders; and they share neighbours, namely in Central Asia. Cooperation with these 
neighbours is formalised within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which was 
founded in 2001 and includes China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kazakhstan. India has an observer status, together with Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia. 
While the SCO started as an organisation concerned with security and border issues, it has 
now extended its scope to strategic issues of economic development, including energy 
issues and transport networks. At the same time, the SCO receives special attention by the 
EU as a partner for regional cooperation, not least because of the relevance of their Central 
Asian members as energy suppliers. Also, these states are members of the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and therefore have a special relationship 
with Europe. Depending on further developments, the SCO could turn into a sub-global 
arena for negotiating cooperative approaches to energy policy and thus acquire relevance 
for climate policy as well. 
Regarding non-Western traditions, both countries see themselves as clearly not belonging 
to the Western bloc, as it is organised in the OECD, although there are nuances between 
both states. While China pictures itself as an alternative to the former colonial powers of 
the West, e. g. in its relationship with Africa, it is able to defend other positions at the 
same time which separate it from the G77 bloc and are clearly defined by its role as global 
player, e. g. in WTO talks and with regard to intellectual property rights. India aligns itself 
strongly with the G77 bloc, and relies heavily on its definition as a developing country, 
e. g. when rejecting any form of future commitment regarding its greenhouse gas 
emissions. Whether these self-definitions will hold in the future, during negotiations on 
the post-2012 climate regime, needs to be seen. It is quite likely that the smaller and 
poorer countries of the region will also turn to the large and growing emitters of the region 
as possible sources for additional funding in order to adapt to the impacts of climate 
change. Which strategy India and China define for the negotiations of the post-2012 
regime and whether they will agree on common elements will be important for their 
political role in the region and on a global level. 
5.1 The case of China 
In the following, we will summarise some basic information on the sources of greenhouse 
gas emissions, climate-relevant policies and on climate change-related policy coordination 
in China, as published in a more detailed paper (Richerzhagen / Scholz 2007). This 
summary illustrates the points made earlier about the nature of the climate change 
problem: it is multisectoral, multilevel and multiscalar; it involves multiple stakeholders; 
the degree and quality of climate-related policy coordination and coherence are influenced 
by several factors, mainly by how the problem is framed and which actors have the 
political lead. A similar study on India is only in preparation, therefore we cannot present 
similarly detailed information on this country here. 
Sources of greenhouse gas emissions: Structural economic change in China led to high 
economic growth rates (above 7 per cent between 1992 and 2004), growing incomes and a 
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higher urbanisation rate. These trends have resulted in drastic increases in energy demand, 
and, accordingly, in enormous increases of absolute greenhouse gas emissions. Today, 
China is the second largest global energy consumer after the US, but also the second 
largest energy producer in the world. Estimates indicate that China’s total primary energy 
consumption will more than double between 2000 and 2020 (World Bank 2006, 50).  
China is the world’s largest emitter of industrial GHG emissions (Baumert / Herzog / 
Pershing 2005, 69). Chinese industry currently consumes 70 per cent of energy. Private 
households are responsible for about 10 per cent of total energy consumption, followed by 
transport with 6 per cent.  
In today’s China, almost 70 per cent of energy generation depends on coal. The 
dominance of coal in China’s energy supply is explained not only by the country’s large 
domestic deposits but also by coal’s superiority over other energy sources in terms of cost, 
time, reliability, controllability and the sales potential of oil in international markets 
(Hatch 2003, 46). Coal releases almost twice as much CO2 per unit of energy as natural 
gas and causes air pollution through sulphur and other particulates. Between 1993 and 
2004, China developed from one of the world's largest exporters of coal to an importer of 
oil in order to meet its energy demand. According to Zhou et al. (2003), in 2020 coal will 
account for 54 to 65 per cent of China’s primary energy use. Renewables will play only a 
minor role for primary energy use. These calculations point to growing increases in GHG 
emissions.  
Policy responses: Energy policy is pivotal for emission reductions. Since 1998, the 
increase of China’s energy supply has been complemented by measures for energy 
conservation and efficiency. Until 2002, China’s percentage increase in energy 
consumption was lower in relative terms than its economic growth rate, which indicates 
efficiency gains. Since then, however, growth in energy consumption has been higher than 
economic growth (Pan et al. 2006, 18). In 2006 the Chinese government responded to this 
situation, defining a very ambitious target to decrease the use of energy in the 11th Five-
Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2006–2010). One objective 
was to reduce the energy intensity of the economy by 4 per cent by the end of 2006 and by 
20 per cent by 2010. To advance and monitor implementation, specific targets were set for 
provinces and industrial sectors. In 2006, energy intensity was cut by 1.33 per cent. 
During the first nine months of 2007, the country's energy use per unit of GDP dropped 3 
per cent (China Daily 2007).18 
A qualitative change is starting to take hold in China with respect to the use of renewable 
energy, which until recently had been viewed as highly peripheral. In 2006 the Renewable 
Energy Law came into force; it establishes renewable energy as a top priority in China’s 
energy strategy. It is based on the ‘feed-in laws’ which have successfully advanced 
renewables in Germany and other European countries. It aims to increase the share of 
                                                 
18  This may have been a result of the specific measures taken by central government to increase pressure 
on local governments, publishing a list of provincial regions that have lagged behind in increasing 
energy efficiency. In 2006, 1,008 enterprises in nine major energy-consuming industries participated in 
an energy efficiency program. Export tax rebates on coal, natural gas and some primary wood products 
were abolished and tax rebates on steel, cement, textile and non-ferrous metal were reduced. Energy 
prices, however, still remain disproportionately low which weakens the impact of energy conservation 
and efficiency policies very much (Pan et al. 2006, 14/21). 
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renewable energy technologies (hydro, wind, biomass and solar) in energy production 
from the current level of 1 per cent to 10 per cent by 2020. 
In June 2007, a National Climate Change Programme was adopted (NDRC 2007). It 
summarises China’s GHG emissions, the likely impacts of climate change, and China’s 
ongoing efforts for mitigating climate change. In the Programme, China defines the 
control of GHG emissions as one of its objectives, and it enumerates the challenges this 
poses for Chinese economic and social development, if it wants to avoid the historical 
linkage between economic growth and growing emissions (NDRC 2007, 19). The section 
’policies and measures’ lists a whole programme for research and development in energy 
technology, as well as institutional reforms. 
Climate-policy coordination: China’s approach to international climate policy has been 
very cautious. In China, climate policy is viewed not mainly as an environmental problem 
but as a policy field with high external and economic significance. Climate policy is thus 
not coordinated by the environmental authority but by much more influential actors, the 
National Reform and Development Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA). NDRC is one of the most important and influential institutions in the 
Chinese political system. It is a macro-economic regulatory department mandated to 
develop national economic strategies, long-term economic plans, and national energy 
policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is in charge of international climate 
diplomacy. In the international arena, it has been China’s priority to ally with other 
developing countries and to speak with one voice. NDRC’s and MOFA’s position in 
international negotiations has always been defined by concerns related to economic 
development, energy security and the protection of sovereignty (Bjørkum 2005, 43). Both 
opposed any commitments not in line with economic growth, e. g. GHG emission 
reductions, and MOFA always concentrated on preventing the imposition of emission 
ceilings and maintaining a narrow understanding of the principle of differentiated 
responsibilities (Hatch 2003, 50). Recently, slight changes in the Chinese international 
position became visible in the UNFCCC conference in Bali where the responsibility for 
common action was acknowledged (in line with the Chinese climate change programme). 
This changing attitude may also be related to an increased awareness of China’s 
vulnerability towards the impacts of climate change (Bjørkum 2005, 43).  
NDRC and MOFA are also the most important actors in the National Coordination 
Committee on Climate change (NCCCC), China’s highest climate policy-making body. It 
consists of 15 bureaucratic units dealing with climate-related policies and activities; it is 
chaired by NDRC.19 The committee members are vice-ministers, deputy director generals 
of the ministries, state commissions or administrations (Nordqvist 2005, 11f.). The 
influence of the State Environment Protection Authority (SEPA) in NCCCC is thought to 
be quite weak because the institution is always confronted with the interests of strong 
sectoral ministries and the NDRC, which assigns lower priority to climate protection 
                                                 
19  Other units are MOFA, Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), CMA, SEPA (deputy chairs), and 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Commerce (MOFCOM), Agriculture (MOA), Construction (MOC), 
Communications (MOC), Water Resources, State Forestry Administration (SFA), Chinese Academy of 
Sciences (CAS), State Oceanic Administration (SOA), and Civil Aviation Administration of China 
(CAAC). 
Poor and powerful – the rise of China and India and the implications for Europe 
German Development Institute 51
(Bjørkum 2005, 44). Yu (2004) interprets SEPA’s weakness regarding climate policy as 
caused by its failure to create specific capacities in this area. 
Central authority vs. local autonomy: China is a centralised state with a strong 
hierarchy, including provinces, cities, counties, and towns, but central government has far 
less influence on the provinces than one would expect. Decentralisation has been initiated 
with economic reforms, and local governments have been granted considerable economic 
and financial power. They have a certain authority over local industries and financial 
resources on the local level (SEI / UNDP 2002, 68). This degree of local political 
autonomy, together with China’s size and complexity, make it difficult for central 
government to oversee the course of actions on the local level. Often, local officials are 
overwhelmed by their tasks because they lack training and access to new laws and 
regulations and the capacity to interpret and implement laws (SEI / UNDP 2002, 78). In 
addition, China’s reforms have strengthened profit orientation in the industrial sector, and 
economic growth has entailed adverse environmental impacts. Local governments thus 
face a conflict between economic and environmental aims and usually give priority to 
economic development of their region, postponing environmental recovery to the future. 
6 Research packages and questions 
From what has been said until now we can derive two main research packages. The first 
package would focus on the internal structures, dynamics and processes that determine 
greenhouse gas emissions and that influence or shape climate-related policies on a 
domestic level as well as the positions of the Asian Drivers in regional and global 
negotiations. This package would refer to the economic and political ‘needs and 
motivations’ (cell 5 in the diagram contained in the paper by John Humphrey and Dirk 
Messner) which have to be recognised when involving the Asian Drivers in innovative 
climate change initiatives. A similar analysis of the determining factors of the EU’s 
climate policy also belongs to this package. 
The second package would focus on the negotiation process for the post-2012 regime, on 
the needed linkages with other global governance arenas and on the likely new lines of 
conflict and interest constellations which will emerge in global politics (cell 7 in the 
diagram contained in the paper by John Humphrey and Dirk Messner). Here, it will also 
be possible to analyse reciprocal perceptions of actors involved in the EU, China and India 
during the negotiation process as well as ongoing initiatives for dialogue and cooperation. 
Linkages between both packages should also be explored, one hypothesis being here that 
regime formation is at least partially an iterative process where domestic policy 
development influences the development of international regimes and vice versa. Another 
hypothesis would be to focus on regional or transnational actor networks and their 
influence on policy formation. 
In both packages it makes sense to use the categories which characterise the nature of the 
climate change problem: multisector, multiscalar, multilevel, multiple stakeholders within 
public administration and civil society.  
Multisectoral drivers of climate change (package one): The economic drivers of 
greenhouse gas emissions in China and India and the most relevant economic sectors stand 
in the centre of attention. While the innovation research package focuses on these driving 
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forces and relevant economic sectors from the perspective of opportunities for a low 
carbon development path, our focus would be on the necessary regulations, the 
environmental parameters shaping them and the political interests defending or opposing 
them. Major questions include: 
– What are the sources of emissions, how are they related to economic growth, which are 
the bottlenecks for reducing them? 
– What is the relationship between climate policy, environmental policy and economic 
growth? 
– What kind of strategies are the Asian Drivers developing in the climate policy arena 
(and related fields)? What do we know about the strategies, and how they are 
changing? 
– What are the factors which determine climate change policy and implementation in 
China and India, and how are these changing?  
– To what extent does our four-fold characterisation of the specificity of the Asian 
Drivers identify the key factors and dynamics in the domestic and regional climate 
policy arena? 
– What is the significance of a growing awareness of the likely domestic impacts of 
climate change and the difficulties in adapting to them for policy development? 
The multisectoral perspective is also relevant for answering the following question from 
package two: 
– What are the critical areas for European policy around global governance and climate 
change over the next five years? 
Multi-actor perspective (packages one and two): The main objective is to identify the 
main relevant regional, national and local actors in China and India, as well as in the Asian 
region, and transnational actor networks which play a role in linking the EU with China 
and India. Major questions include: 
– Which actors advocate a proactive policy or strategy for mitigating climate change? 
– Which are the procedures for policy coordination, which factors determine their 
effectiveness and how are they changing? 
– Which networks on domestic, regional and transnational level are important promoters 
of learning processes? 
– Which actors determine climate change policy and implementation in China and India, 
and how are their attitudes changing?  
– To what extent does our four-fold characterisation of the specificity of the Asian 
Drivers help to identify the key actors and understand their behaviour? 
Multilevel perspective (packages one and two): Here the focus would be on the 
feedbacks between policy formation and implementation on the sub-national, national, 
regional as well as global level. The EU as a body with highly developed and 
differentiated procedures for multilevel governance is an interesting case in itself and 
could inspire policy coordination and implementation in large and diverse countries such 
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as India and China. Cooperation and dialogue initiatives between levels and regions could 
also be analysed here. Major questions include: 
– How does policy coordination and implementation in climate-related policy fields 
develop in China and India? What are main obstacles or positive learning experiences? 
– How is climate policy formation developing in the EU in 2008 and 2009? 
– What are the linkages between energy policy cooperation and the emerging post-2012 
regime in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? 
– What is the potential for an EU engagement with China and India to influence these 
policy-making and implementation dynamics? 
Multisectoral climate-relevant policies at the international/global level (package two): 
Here the focus would be on the climate policy arena as such as well as on the linkages 
with other global governance arenas such as the WTO (emission trading, property rights 
and technology transfer), international energy policies (Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization; International Energy Agency), the climate-related role and policies of the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and possibly the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (which is an important actor in Central Asia); the role of 
the Asian Drivers in the debate on the climate-related reforms of the UN system (future of 
United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], United Nations Development 
programme [UNDP], Global Environment Facility [GEF]). In each case, the focus would 
be on the role and initiatives of the Asian Drivers as well as on the challenges and 
opportunities for the EU. All these arenas will be relevant beyond 2009. Major questions 
include: 
– How have China, India and the EU positioned themselves in international negotiations 
on the post-2012 regime? 
– How far were they able to shape the regime according to their expectations? Which 
interests and power constellations does the agreed regime reflect? 
– What kind of long-term strategies are the Asian Drivers developing in the climate 
policy arena and other related global policy fields? What do we know about the 
strategies, inter-linkages between them and how they are changing? 
– To what extent does our four-fold characterisation of the specificity of the Asian 
Drivers identify the key factors and dynamics of their strategies in the climate policy 
arena? 
– How do we transfer the debates on diverging macro scenarios for global governance 
and Asian Drivers to climate change issues? 
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V What next? How to organise the research we need? 
Hubert Schmitz 
There is little doubt that the rise of China and India presents major new challenges for 
Europe. The preceding papers by Altenburg, Humphrey, Messner and Scholz go straight 
to the frontiers of knowledge and identify the questions which future policy-oriented 
research needs to address. They have been particularly concerned with the rise of China 
and India as innovation powers and with their increasingly important role in finding 
solutions to global climate change. As set out in the introduction, in both these fields, 
European business and policy needs to address issues of conflict/competition but also find 
ways of working together with China and India. And both fields are related to each other 
in that innovative capacity is essential for mitigating climate change. Ways forward 
require the ability to define the issues clearly and see them from both the Asian and 
European side. This is what the preceding papers sought to achieve. The purpose of this 
final paper is to discuss how we can move this agenda forward. It asks how can the 
proposed agenda be researched and acted upon in an effective way? 
To this end, this paper pulls together the lessons from our previous work. It then turns to 
the future, focusing on issues of research governance. Which way of organising the 
research is likely to address the new challenges effectively? 
1 What are the lessons from our previous work? 
This section draws on our experience to date in research on the Asian Drivers of global 
change. The experience in this and related fields of policy research helps to identify the 
key challenges which future research needs to address. These challenges are all about 
overcoming divisions between different specialisations and bringing about new forms of 
interaction: between researchers from different traditions, between researchers and policy 
makers, and between Asia and Europe. The subsequent section will then discuss 
alternative ways of organising future research and funding: the central proposition is that 
the governance of research and funding has a major impact on whether research 
challenges identified in this section can be addressed successfully.   
2 Internal dynamics and changing external impacts  
Much attention has been given in recent research to the impact of China (and to a lesser 
extent India) on the other parts of the world. Much progress has been made in 
understanding both threats and opportunities and unravelling the many different ways that 
China and India impact upon other countries. The main weakness in this work so far is 
that insufficient consideration is given to how these impacts keep changing as a result of 
rapid changes within China and India. And little consideration is given to how 
engagement with China and India can substantially change these impacts.  
This may seem an obvious and predictable problem but it can be explained easily. While 
the rising Asian powers have attracted enormous attention worldwide, research has been 
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fragmented. Our participation in numerous workshops and conferences suggests that 
researchers tend to be good at either understanding developments internal to China and 
India or observing the repercussions of these developments for other countries, but very 
few have the capability or resources to bring the two together.   
The implication for future research on the impacts of the rising Asian powers for Europe is 
clear. It will need to be research on their internal dynamics and the changing external 
impacts. It is very difficult for individuals to achieve this, but a network organised around 
the connections between these two issues can live up to this challenge. 
3 Integrating different competences  
It is widely acknowledged that researchers in both natural and social sciences tend to be 
overspecialised and that the disciplinary divides stand in the way of providing a better 
understanding of the world and providing insights which are relevant for policy.  
This is particularly so in the issues which are of central concern to this workshop. Take the 
case of China’s role in mitigating climate change. It requires bringing together expertise in 
climate science, global governance and China’ internal governance and politics 
(Richerzhagen / Scholz 2008). Or take the case of India’s and China’s advances in 
innovation. These advances cannot be assessed and understood by using only an 
innovation systems approach. As set out in the background paper by Altenburg / Schmitz / 
Stamm (2008), one needs to combine different approaches (national innovation system, 
global value chain, and other approaches). Integrating them is difficult because each 
specialisation has its own concepts and its own ways of ordering (or ignoring) the world. 
Even communication can be difficult, let alone working together on a common problem. 
Private companies have recognised that advancing in global competition requires 
integrating different competences and promoting learning across different subsidiaries, 
and that this in turn requires managers capable of bringing these competences together. 
The same applies even more in research on the issues which are the focus of this 
workshop. 
4 Observing through two (or more) lenses 
Another lesson from the work to date is that the same issue is often perceived in very 
different ways, depending on whether it is seen through an Asian or European lens. 
European observers stunned by the speed with which China burst on the global scene, find 
it difficult to believe in China’s own image of this process as ‘peaceful rise’. The 
importance of adding a Chinese lens to European analysis is shown by the work of Gu / 
Humphrey / Messner (2008) on the implications of China’s rise for global governance. 
The paper brings home that the Chinese approach to international relations is characterised 
by: 
– Interdependence. China sees its increasing participation in world trade as entirely in 
harmony with the globalisation process.  
– Identity dilemma. While recognising its economic power, China sees itself as a 
newcomer that has to learn and observe how to operate in international fora. 
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– Pragmatism. Aware of its own vulnerabilities, China’s global self-presentation is 
cautious and reactive – suiting an ingrained cultural style.  
For Western analysts such perceptions are difficult to understand when they observe the 
operations of Chinese companies in the world which are often anything but cautious and 
reactive. The key here is that we can no longer equate the views and actions of the Chinese 
government with that of Chinese companies. The private sector is outstripping the 
capacity of the government to control it. This makes it even more difficult to understand to 
what extent Europe can put pressure on China to devote more attention to its global 
responsibility. For the time being, researchers and politicians need to recognise: 
“… the collective mentality of a country anxious not to make the world afraid 
of it, while it pursues a pathway of rapid economic development. However, 
China is simultaneously a country with a colonial history and a firm 
unwillingness simply to accept Western moral and political hegemony. 
Intercivilisational equality and mutual respect are not merely code-words for 
peace. They also imply that mutual respect and the importance of avoiding 
conflict should involve the notion of ‘minding one’s own business.” (Gu / 
Humphrey / Messner 2007, 10). 
This passage seems highly relevant to understand recent tensions between West European 
and Chinese politicians. Interestingly it comes from the Chinese co-author of an insightful 
paper which shows the gains (and the pains) of collaboration between European and 
Chinese researchers.   
5 Big differences between China and India 
China and India have important features in common: big economies, long periods of very 
fast growth, huge populations, hundreds of millions remain poor. There are thus important 
reasons for analysing them together, as we have done in much of our work on ‘Asian 
Drivers’.  
But there are also important differences:  
– The Chinese economy is deeply integrated into the East Asian production systems and 
the world economy. By comparison, the Indian economy is still inward oriented (the 
main exception is the software industry). 
– The legitimacy of the Chinese government – at central and local level – seems to 
depend on continuing fast economic growth. In the Indian case, this is much less so. 
– While growth continues, the Chinese government has greater power to invest 
enormous financial resources and to enforce change from the top than the Indian 
government; however the increasing power of local government in China means that 
this difference diminishes with time. 
– With regard to international orientation, India sees it itself as a developing nation 
strengthening the influence of the G77 whereas China sees itself as an emerging global 
power.  
Hubert Schmitz and Dirk Messner (eds) 
 German Development Institute 58 
These differences between China and India affect not only the internal dynamics in these 
countries but also the prospects for and types of international cooperation.   
From a research point of view, the differences need to be kept in mind because they 
increase complexity and thus make research more difficult. But they also offer an 
opportunity:  the possibility of meaningful comparison. Organising such comparisons is a 
task for future research. Equally, exploring how the interplay of China and India affect 
Europe is important.  
6 Constructing common interests across the current divide(s) 
A continuation of current trends leads to competition and conflict between Europe and the 
new Asian powers. Attempts to avoid such conflicts have concentrated on negotiating 
targets – in particular with regard to climate change. Targets for reducing carbon 
emissions are the centre of attention. If agreed and complied with, they would indeed 
make a significant difference. The objective is clear but ways of achieving it are not. It 
remains uncertain how much governance through global rules can achieve. One of the 
main problems is that it pitches the battle lines in terms of China (and/or India) versus 
Europe or Europe versus the United States of America.    
Future research needs to pay more attention to the battle lines within these countries and to 
the possibilities of constructing common interests across the current divides. It would 
mean shifting the debate to governance through global relationships.    
Take the example of energy efficient technology. German firms are amongst the leaders in 
this field. German technology institutes are connected to these firms. Chinese firms and 
technology institutes are keen to cooperate. Identifying existing and potential alliances and 
exploring how they can be strengthened is an important task. The hypothesis is that 
constructing common interests across the Europe–Asia divide and across the public–
private divide is an important way forward. If this is so, political science expertise will be 
needed to analyse state–business relations at both the national and international level. The 
key point is that expertise on the politics of national and international policy making needs 
to be added to technical and economic expertise. 
7 Connecting research and policy 
The purpose of the research in question is to influence policy. The expectation is that the 
research contributes to policy formulation and that the proposed measures are then taken 
up by those in power. Both the DIE and IDS have a long history of contributing to policy 
making in this way. This route and sequence does however have its limitations. It is based 
on a linear process of the policy making process.  
In our experience there are other important ways in which our research can influence 
action: by changing the ways issues and priorities are perceived, by framing agendas for 
action, by becoming embedded in an institution which serves as a source of ongoing 
influence. For all these modes, it is useful to write outputs which are specifically 
addressed to the policy making community. Producing policy briefs which distil policy 
lessons are essential instruments.  
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All these ways of connecting research to policy are important but not enough. In the fields 
of innovation and climate, the questions to be addressed change rapidly. Researchers 
typically take the lead from literature when defining their research questions. This ensures 
academic acceptance but induces time lags which render much research irrelevant for 
policy making in government or business. Shortening the cycle is possible by arranging 
extended meetings between researchers and government officials from relevant Ministries. 
The German Development Institute has experimented with this to mutual advantage. The 
key point is to bring the policy makers into the early stage of carrying out the research and 
not just at the end. Making such arrangements is difficult to justify for an individual 
researcher but becomes more feasible if organised for a group of researchers. 
There are thus ways of bringing policy concerns early into the research process. The 
challenge does not stop there. As stressed earlier, perspectives on these policy concerns 
often differ between old European and new Asian powers. Mutual understanding will 
require more collaboration between researchers from both sides and this collaboration can 
then feed into the policy process. All this is difficult to achieve and requires investment. 
Perhaps the most promising way of achieving this is to target the young/future decision 
makers (30-40 year old).  
8 Finding a way forward 
Like many other branches of economic activity, the research business is affected by 
frequent changes and fashions. It is however safe to predict that the issues raised in the 
preceding papers will be with us for a very long time. It is also safe to assert that the 
research cannot be carried out by European researchers on their own – nor by Asian 
researchers alone. Collaborative research is needed but genuine collaboration is 
notoriously difficult. This final section therefore reflects on how best to organise 
internationally collaborative research. Discussions on the ‘HOW?’ rarely receive sufficient 
attention. We mean here not detailed research methodology but the governance of 
internationally collaborative research. This is not just an add-on, the governance of 
research and funding has a major influence on the kind of insights and findings one can 
expect to come out of the research.   
9 Governance of research: a new constellation of actors in research 
Organising research on the implications of the rising Asian powers for Europe is different 
from conducting research on say Germany–UK relationships or even Europe–USA 
relations. Lenses, conceptual frameworks, actor constellations, previous research 
experience, research-policy nexus, funding environment tend to be much more similar 
across Western Europe and North America. While always challenging, one can get on 
with the business of organising the research fairly speedily without too much concern of 
equal partnership. A clear indication of this is that leading research institutes are often 
happy not to be the convenors of cross-national research programmes so as to avoid the 
high transaction costs of coordination and be able to concentrate on the research itself. 
Note that they are only likely to relinquish the convening role when they feel that partners 
with similar competence and intellectual frameworks will be ‘in charge’.   
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Research collaboration involving the new Asian powers and the old European powers also 
has different characteristics from research in the field of development studies that brings 
together OECD and developing country researchers. The latter has tended to proceed in 
post-colonial fashion with Europe (or the United States) setting the agenda and providing 
the funding, while developing country institutes are subcontracted to provide the country-
specific data. There are significant attempts to change this but the post-colonial mindset 
and research organisation continue to prevail, with most developing country researchers 
reacting to and feeding into agendas set by their European colleagues.  
This pattern of working is completely unacceptable to the research institutes in the rising 
powers of Asia. It is also negates the changes that have occurred in the real world where 
the (former) ‘periphery’ has begun to drive the changes in the (former) ‘centre’. And it is 
counterproductive: if indeed the solutions to the big challenges lie in international 
cooperation, then the research needs to be organised in a way which enhances equal 
partnership.  
10 Alternative ways of organising the research 
When reflecting on the pros and cons of different ways of organising internationally 
collaborative research, it helps to specify whether one is dealing with a project or 
programme (consisting of many projects) and how experienced the participating 
researchers are. Let us assume for the purpose of the discussion that we are dealing with a 
sizeable postdoctoral programme and that the researchers come from China, India and 
Western Europe. 
In principle there are two ways of organising such a postdoctoral programme. There is 
first the open competition–lean management model. The grant-holder becomes an 
intermediary of the funding organisation(s) and has the tasks of: 
– defining the research agenda and parameters 
– advertising/inviting applications from around the world 
– selecting the most promising proposals/candidates 
– bringing the researchers together for two or three workshops to exchange experience 
– ensuring that each researcher publishes his/her own findings 
– producing a collective volume containing the best contributions.  
This way of organising a research programme is transparent, relies on the ambition of the 
individual researcher to publish and provides an organisational (and sometimes also 
intellectual) framework so that the individual researcher is not entirely isolated. The costs 
for management are low, concentrated on the tasks of holding a few workshops and 
monitoring quality and time schedule. Quality will inevitably be uneven but the chance of 
some excellent contributions is high. And critically, the researchers define the questions to 
be answered. Within the broad parameters of the programme, the researcher is in control 
of the agenda. In order to ensure that both Asian and European perspectives have equal 
chances of obtaining support, the selection committee would need to have composition of 
something like one Chinese, one Indian, one German and one British senior researcher. 
Similarly, referees would need to come from both the Asian and European side.  
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There are clear strengths to this way of organising the research. There are also 
weaknesses. It is very difficult to bring together researchers that have started by 
developing their research agendas without reference to each other. And institutional, as 
opposed to individual, development would remain limited.  
One way of addressing these problems would be a more actively managed research 
programme. The main reasons for intensive management would be to foster the 
interactions that otherwise might not occur:   
– integrating different competences (disciplines, sectors) 
– combining Asian and European perspectives 
– making connections between different dynamics  
– developing an evolving research agenda over time that reflects an increasing mutual 
understanding of key research issues between researchers in different countries 
– facilitating and maintaining continuous interaction between policy makers and 
researchers. 
Managing this process means much deeper involvement of senior staff in the research 
process, for example organising mini teams that make direct comparisons, organising 
meetings with policy makers, ensuring that researchers from different disciplines interact 
and do not give up when they run into problems, or mediating intercultural difficulties. All 
this means substantially higher management costs, enormous dependence on the skills of 
the research managers, considerable interdependence between researchers (loss of 
autonomy), and more friction between the researchers. It also means that more time is 
needed to conduct the research because collaboration is time consuming. The costs are 
higher than in the first model but the chances of capturing the connections and interactions 
neglected in most current work are also higher. 
These considerations help to identify the questions to be addressed by those concerned 
with funding or setting a research programme on the implications of the rising Asian 
powers for Europe:  
– What are the strengths and weaknesses of the outlined ways of organising a research 
programme?  
– What would be the appropriate forms of managing the research programme – in other 
words, what would be the appropriate governance structure for research collaboration? 
To what extent can the research process be managed? What is the skill profile of the 
manager(s) that would be needed? 
– Should there be open recruitment or targeted recruitment from a very small number of 
partner institutes? 
– If a strategic partnership model is chosen, how should the allocation of resources be 
decided? 
o Equal allocation of postdoctoral fellowships to each partner? 
o According to financial need (low in the case of partners that are state funded, high 
in the case of self-funded organisations)?  
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o In accordance with quality of submitted proposals judged by a management 
committee? 
– How many years should the postdoctoral projects last? In the first model? In the 
second model?  
– Should cross-national collaborations form an important part of the research?  
– How strong should the comparative approach be? Should one build trilateral teams 
focusing on the same topics? Or be more flexible in order to capture country-specific 
issues? 
– Is it necessary to have one organisational approach for the entire postdoctoral 
programme? Is it better to identify different bundles of research questions and then 
organise the research in accordance with the research questions and in accordance with 
preferences and capabilities of partners? 
– Which is the most effective way of organising the research-policy interface? Who 
would be the most appropriate partners for this in Europe, China and India?  
– What is the best way of providing Asian scholars with an experience in European 
policy making bodies? 
– What is the best way of providing European scholars with an experience in Asian 
policy making bodies?  
– It is generally assumed that Asian scholars are fluent in English. Should European 
researchers learn Chinese? India is so much easier in this respect for many European 
scholars, but it is China that has attracted most attention by European researchers.  
– What can be learnt from industry about organising research networks across 
intercultural divides? 
The Institute of Development Studies and the German Development Institute have some 
experience of managing international research consortia and addressing the issues of 
governance and mutual capacity building. This experience shows that there are trade offs 
that need to be considered from the start. Is the priority:  
– Excellence in research (publishing in refereed journals) or mutual capacity building?  
– Excellence of research or equality amongst the partners? 
– Speedy research results or building long-term relationships between people and 
institutions? 
These trade offs do not arise necessarily but it is useful to keep in them in mind when 
setting up internationally collaborative research dealing with the big questions identified 
in this paper.  
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